

POLITICAL INTERDEPENDENCE

Evidence from Migrant Voter Turnout in 1,267 Elections Worldwide

Laurence Go[×], Nicolas Fliess⁺, Eva Østergaard-Nielsen⁻

[×] University of Oslo

⁺ Max Planck Institute for Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

⁻ Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Why Political Interdependence?

- Globalization, social media, and global events such as the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic → increasing political interdependence
- **Political interdependence:** situations where change in one setting influences the political outcome in another
- Mostly been discussed in the context of trade and financial flows
- **International migration as a driver:** through migrants' *own* electoral participation
- Important (!)
 - There are \approx 280 million international migrants worldwide
 - >140 countries have extended voting rights to emigrants

- **Question:** Do country of residence (CoR) elections impact migrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections?
 - Example: effect of Spanish election → turnout of Filipino migrants living in Spain for the Philippine elections
- **Context:** transnational voting (vote from abroad)
- **Identification:** timing differential between CoR and CoO election (before vs. after, how many days)
- **Result:** 7pp increase in turnout when CoO election happens after (vs. before) the CoR election
- **Mechanism:** Salience of (close) CoR electoral results → interest in political process → increase in CoO turnout

Interdependence in political attitudes using rare events

Costa-Font and Ljunge, 2023; Delis, Matakos, and Xeferis, 2020; Malet and Walter, 2024; Turnbull-Dugarte and Rama, 2022

→ Consider political behaviour and use >1,000 election events worldwide

Impact of migration on democratization

Barsbai et al., 2017; Mercier, 2016; Pfutze, 2012; Spilimbergo, 2009

→ Direct measure of migrants' own political behaviour

Determinants of voter turnout

Bekkouche, Cagé, and Dewitte, 2022; Bursztyn et al., 2024; Fujiwara, Meng, and Vogl, 2016; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi, 2017; Pons, 2018

→ Migrant turnout, instead of domestic voter turnout

1. Context: Emigrant Enfranchisement + Transnational Voting
2. Data: Emigrant Voting Patterns (EVP)
3. Identification: Timing of Elections
4. Results
5. Robustness Checks
6. Proposed & Alternative Mechanisms


Emigrant Enfranchisement

- Over the last three decades, the majority of the world's states extended voting rights to non-resident citizens
- Mass enfranchisement of **≈200 million emigrants** in the elections of over **140 countries** around the world
- Incorporating diaspora votes has the potential to change election outcomes: Cape Verde, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Romania, Uruguay and the USA
- Growing international migration + continued extension of migrant voting rights = larger political impact

Transnational Context

- **Transnational voting:** migrants live in one country (CoR) but vote in elections of another (CoO)
- **Ideal for identification:** date of CoR election independent from the date of CoO election
- **Ideal for mechanisms:** institutional environment migrants are exposed to \neq political setting they participate in
 - electoral systems, voting laws and clientelistic practices in the host country are much less influential
 - voter fatigue only matters when migrants can vote in both elections
 - local campaigns usually not targeted toward migrant voters

Data: Emigrant Voting Patterns



- First & most comprehensive global dataset on migrant voting behavior ▶
- Voting results of resident and non-resident citizens in national elections, disaggregated by CoR
- 180 elections in 43 CoOs in the world from 2000-2019, covering 217 CoRs

Summary Statistics

Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS BY N-DAY WINDOW

Variable	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
Elections Before	161	283	474	659	844	1048	1287	2433
Elections After	129	241	448	647	851	1063	1297	2431
Days Before	7.22	14.48	26.89	40.14	54.72	70.61	88.12	172.96
Days After	9.64	16.34	29.27	43.38	58.35	73.79	90.26	171.88
CoO Turnout Before	53.79	54.02	53.94	54.19	55.29	55.47	55.54	56.48
CoO Turnout After	60.62	60.53	59.62	58.43	56.84	56.6	56.73	56.87
CoR Turnout	66.07	65.98	65.93	66.02	66.11	65.91	65.77	66

- **Sample Construction:** link CoO election to closest CoR elections (before *and* after) ▶
- **Final Sample:** 180 elections across 43 CoOs + 1,267 elections across 185 CoRs = 2,426 CoO-CoR pairs and 19,428 CoO-CoR observations
- Higher CoO turnout after vs. before the CoR election

Identification Strategy: Election Timing


- **Identification challenge**

- Migrants' choice of destination is influenced by the CoR sociopolitical environment
- Presence of migrants can affect CoR elections, especially when immigration is a salient electoral issue
- Migrant selection into certain destination countries can therefore lead to the concentration of migrant types who may be more or less likely to vote
- Exploit **electoral calendars of CoR and CoO**: CoO elections in some years may come before a CoR election, but may come after in other years
- **Argument**: whether a CoO election occurs before or after a CoR election (and how many days before or after) is *deemed almost random*

Identification Strategy: Election Timing


Figure 1: ELECTORAL CALENDAR

Timing of Spanish Elections vs. CoO Elections



(a) Spain (irregular) ▶

Timing of US Elections vs. CoO Elections



(b) USA (regular) ▶

- A quasi-experiment with 2 groups: **treatment** (CoO election *after* CoR election) and **control** (CoO election *before* CoR election)

$$Turnout_{ort} = \alpha + \beta_1 Post_{ort} + \epsilon_{ort} \quad (1)$$

$$Turnout_{ort} = \alpha + \gamma_1 Post_{ort} + \gamma_2 Days_{ort} + \gamma_3 Post \times Days_{ort} + \epsilon_{ort} \quad (2)$$

$$\forall Days_{ort} \leq \{15, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 360\}$$

where $Turnout_{ort}$ is the turnout of migrant voters residing in CoR r for the CoO o election closest to the CoR election at year t , $Post_{ort}$ is whether the CoO election happens after (1) or before (0) the CoR election at year t , and $Days_{ort}$ is the number of days to/from the closest CoR election (in absolute value). Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of the CoR.

Result #1: Migrant turnout is around 4-7pp higher when the CoO election happens after the CoR election.

Table 2: TURNOUT BY *N*-DAY WINDOWS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0683*	0.0650**	0.0569***	0.0424**	0.0155	0.0113	0.0119	0.00394
	(0.0371)	(0.0285)	(0.0198)	(0.0175)	(0.0164)	(0.0146)	(0.0140)	(0.00906)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.57	.567	.563	.561	.56	.561	.567
R ²	.0108	.0102	.00767	.00423	.00057	.000307	.000348	.0000389
No. of CoO	30	31	35	35	36	36	37	39
No. of CoR	109	128	144	157	163	169	174	177
CoO Elections	95	110	126	128	131	132	137	142
CoR Elections	229	360	534	633	704	767	822	981
N	290	524	922	1,306	1,695	2,111	2,584	4,864

- Extensive margin: *Post-Election* > 0
- Intensive margin: coefficients decrease as the window is extended

Result #2: Effect wanes and takes around 70 days to completely dissipate.

Table 3: INTERACTED WITH DAYS TO/FROM COR ELECTION

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	-0.0528 (0.0852)	0.0279 (0.0610)	0.0295 (0.0425)	0.0575* (0.0340)	0.0826*** (0.0289)	0.0628** (0.0255)	0.0463** (0.0233)	0.0392* (0.0200)
Days	-0.00678 (0.00489)	-0.000960 (0.00210)	-0.000186 (0.000720)	0.000127 (0.000483)	0.000509 (0.000336)	0.000310 (0.000212)	0.000193 (0.000157)	0.000175*** (0.0000657)
Post × Days	0.0143* (0.00795)	0.00238 (0.00340)	0.000950 (0.00127)	-0.000357 (0.000741)	-0.00118** (0.000486)	-0.000712** (0.000322)	-0.000385 (0.000243)	-0.000204* (0.000107)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.57	.567	.563	.561	.56	.561	.567
R ²	.0218	.0113	.00844	.00444	.00483	.0028	.00143	.00179
N	290	524	922	1,306	1,695	2,111	2,584	4,864

- No pre-election trend in CoO turnout (i.e. *Days*=0).
- Suggests a *post*-election mechanism?

Robustness Checks & Extensions

- Expand day windows ▶
- Add time fixed effects ▶
- Explore regularity of election calendars ▶
- Change sampling choice ▶
- Leave one (country) out ▶
- Add country controls ▶
- Balance test of CoO & CoR variables ▶
- Placebo: planned vs. actual dates ▶
- Regression discontinuity ▶
- Local elections ▶

Mechanism: Salience of CoR Election Results

- **Post-election factor:** CoR election results
- **Argument:** Salience of CoR election results activates migrants to turnout in their own CoO election
- **Evidence:**
 1. Migrant interest in CoO election (proxied by Google Trends) increases post-CoR election
 2. Closer CoR elections → larger effect on migrant turnout
 3. CoO media organizations report on CoR election results (greater coverage for closer CoR elections)
 4. Migrant turnout higher when CoO media reports on the CoR election

Mechanism: Election Results & Migrant Interest (I)




- Scrape Google Trends for searches of CoO keywords in all CoRs within a 60-day window around the CoR election 
 - Top news organizations in the CoO and the CoO electoral commission

Figure 3: GOOGLE TRENDS 'INTEREST OVER TIME' INDEX



(a) News Organizations 



(b) Electoral Commission 

Mechanism: Election Results & Migrant Interest (I)

Table 4: GOOGLE TRENDS

	News Organizations					Electoral Commissions				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Post-Election	-2.236*** (0.419)	-2.037*** (0.500)	-2.236*** (0.420)	-2.236*** (0.422)	-2.189*** (0.400)	-7.103*** (0.404)	-6.838*** (0.485)	-7.103*** (0.405)	-7.103*** (0.407)	-6.777*** (0.486)
CoO after CoR	-2.556* (1.521)	-7.537*** (1.894)	-3.771*** (1.094)	-3.318*** (0.694)	-2.892*** (0.702)	-7.628*** (1.055)	-5.675*** (1.058)	-6.345*** (0.689)	-7.844*** (0.712)	-7.023*** (0.709)
Post × CoO > CoR	6.054*** (0.507)	5.332*** (0.499)	6.054*** (0.508)	6.054*** (0.510)	5.188*** (0.474)	14.23*** (0.539)	12.67*** (0.612)	14.23*** (0.540)	14.23*** (0.542)	12.56*** (0.614)
Dep Var Mean	45.1	45.1	45.1	45.1	45.1	12	12	12	12	12
FE	None	Time	Country	Election	All	None	Time	Country	Election	All
R ²	.00606	.401	.513	.675	.719	.0303	.196	.207	.237	.261
N	34,587	34,587	34,587	34,587	34,587	29,646	29,646	29,646	29,646	29,646

- Pre-election period is stable and similar for both groups
- Interest surges after the CoR election (among people whose CoO election occurs after the CoR election); consistent with prior results using EVP data

Mechanism: Close Election Results & Migrant Turnout (II)



Table 5: TURNOUT AND CLOSE ELECTIONS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	-0.0130 (0.0589)	0.0159 (0.0466)	-0.00253 (0.0364)	-0.00160 (0.0301)	-0.0192 (0.0292)	-0.0202 (0.0249)	-0.0206 (0.0232)	-0.0168 (0.0132)
Close Election (CoR)	-0.0275 (0.0497)	-0.00496 (0.0374)	-0.00930 (0.0326)	0.000458 (0.0249)	0.00601 (0.0236)	0.00411 (0.0218)	-0.00917 (0.0198)	-0.0180 (0.0152)
Post × Close Election	0.142* (0.0770)	0.0878 (0.0565)	0.0981** (0.0457)	0.0753* (0.0398)	0.0606 (0.0367)	0.0568* (0.0314)	0.0597** (0.0282)	0.0396** (0.0173)
Dep Var Mean	.561	.567	.566	.562	.56	.561	.562	.567
R ²	.0242	.0183	.0159	.0102	.0057	.00471	.0035	.00102
N	276	505	890	1,271	1,654	2,059	2,519	4,763

- CoR elections that are close have a significantly larger impact on CoO turnout, while less competitive CoR elections do not have any impact on CoO turnout.
- Consistent with Bursztyn et al. (2024)

Mechanism: Close Election Results & Media Coverage (III)

Figure 5: NUMBER OF ARTICLES MENTIONING THE CoR ELECTION ▶ GDELT



(a) CoR Election Coverage of CoR vs. Non-CoR Media Organizations ▶

(b) Non-CoR Media Coverage for Close vs. Non-Close CoR Elections ▶

- Panel A: non-CoR media coverage of the CoR election increases post-election
- Panel B: non-CoR media coverage is greater for close CoR elections

Mechanism: Media Coverage & Migrant Turnout (IV)

Table 6: TURNOUT AND MEDIA COVERAGE

	Sample with Missing Observations				Missing Replaced with Zeroes			
	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0255 (0.0693)	-0.0212 (0.0504)	0.0211 (0.0401)	0.00811 (0.0340)	0.0721* (0.0367)	0.0683** (0.0289)	0.0534** (0.0205)	0.0408** (0.0180)
Media (CoO)	-0.513*** (0.0405)	-0.111 (0.307)	-0.172** (0.0869)	-0.127 (0.0857)	-0.489*** (0.0247)	-0.0697 (0.302)	-0.155* (0.0819)	-0.117 (0.0858)
Post × Media	0.361** (0.161)	0.0303 (0.340)	0.210 (0.142)	0.145 (0.139)	0.314** (0.152)	-0.0592 (0.333)	0.177 (0.135)	0.112 (0.138)
Dep Var Mean	.564	.569	.567	.556	.568	.57	.567	.563
R ²	.0254	.00414	.00809	.00314	.0233	.0125	.0097	.0052
N	111	194	329	460	290	524	922	1,306

- Higher migrant turnout when CoO media reports on the CoR election
- Only evident in the first 15 days, consistent with short-lived spike in coverage. 20

Alternative Explanations

- **Learning about being pivotal:** close elections make people think they could be pivotal in their own election ▶
- **Habit formation:** those who have voted in CoR election will vote in CoO (not many dual citizens) ▶
- **Return migration:** CoR results lead migrants to plan return home ▶
- **Immigrant identity:** salience of immigration platform ▶
- **Contagion effect:** higher CoR turnout may encourage migrants to turn out ▶
- **Uncertainty:** closeness not only affects salience, but also unpredictability of results ▶

Conclusion

- Growth of international migration and emigrant enfranchisement → migrant electoral behavior across borders amplifies political interdependence
- Transnational context as an ideal laboratory: studying the effect of CoR elections on migrant turnout in CoO elections
- EVP Dataset: novel data source on migrant turnout for 43 CoOs, 200+ CoR, and 1,267 elections from 2000-2019
- Political interdependence driven by international migration: ↑ 7pp in migrant turnout post-CoR election
- Mechanism of salience where migrants observe close CoR election results and are driven to get out and vote

Appendix

- Identified countries which carried out elections abroad between 2000-2019; exclude 18 countries with no data and 62 countries that did not respond

Table 7: SUMMARY STATISTICS BY EXCLUSION CRITERIA


	Included	No Data	No Response	Not Enfranchised
Emigration (in Millions)	1.413	1.206	1.326	1.043
Emigration Rate	10.310	5.838	8.331	18.200
Immigration (in Millions)	1.006	5.509	0.891	0.719
Immigration Rate	4.368	15.264	7.744	11.441
Net Migration (in '000s)	-0.014	0.642	-0.048	-0.130
Net Migration Rate	-1.266	4.235	0.027	0.145
Employment Rate	54.456	59.784	54.023	58.192
Polity Score	6.073	8.722	2.536	2.327
Electoral Democracy Index	0.594	0.767	0.461	0.454
Clean Elections Index	0.640	0.865	0.460	0.481
Corruption Perception Index	39.884	68.000	38.719	39.642
GDP per capita	8668.253	43653.178	11628.239	16982.116
Trade (% of GDP)	78.564	118.125	83.918	93.543
Population (in Millions)	33.445	40.554	23.372	57.473
Remittances (% of GDP)	4.160	1.932	4.090	6.207
Observations	43	18	62	70

In constructing the sample for this paper, we merge the EVP Dataset with the NELDA Dataset.¹

- whether to merge all rounds of elections *or* just the **first** round from NELDA
- whether to merge one EVP (CoO) election with the closest or nearest NELDA (CoR) election in time (regardless of whether it is before or after) *or* merge one EVP (CoO) election with the **two** closest NELDA (CoR) elections: one before and one after the EVP (CoO) election.
- whether same day elections of different types (i.e., presidential and legislative) will be **both** included or only one of them will be included.

¹The NELDA dataset includes all dates of national elections around the world. Our sample choices are in **boldface**.

Timing of Spanish Elections vs. CoO Elections



Timing of US Elections vs. CoO Elections





Figure 7: ELECTION WINDOW BY WEEK



- Results are statistically significant until the 100-day mark

Table 8: ADDING TIME FIXED EFFECTS (60-DAY WINDOW)

	None	Day (CoO)	Day (CoR)	Day (Both)	Month (CoO)	Month (CoR)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-Election	0.0650** (0.0285)	0.0851*** (0.0266)	0.0637** (0.0291)	0.0838*** (0.0275)	0.0476* (0.0254)	0.0745** (0.0331)
Dep Var Mean	.57	.57	.57	.57	.57	.57
R ²	.0102	.145	.0181	.15	.141	.106
N	524	524	524	524	524	524

- Results remain statistically significant

Table 9: TURNOUT BY ELECTION INTERVAL SIMILARITY

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0565 (0.0409)	0.0723** (0.0303)	0.0609*** (0.0225)	0.0407** (0.0195)	0.0176 (0.0184)	0.0157 (0.0167)	0.0166 (0.0152)	0.00683 (0.0102)
Same Interval (CoR & CoO)	-0.0382 (0.0873)	0.0224 (0.0595)	-0.0131 (0.0497)	-0.00301 (0.0384)	0.00134 (0.0359)	0.0169 (0.0323)	0.0146 (0.0269)	0.000353 (0.0246)
Post × Same Interval	0.0826 (0.112)	-0.0432 (0.0771)	-0.0265 (0.0604)	0.00691 (0.0477)	-0.0154 (0.0460)	-0.0261 (0.0408)	-0.0271 (0.0357)	-0.0167 (0.0300)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.57	.567	.563	.56	.56	.561	.566
R ²	.0128	.0109	.00866	.00415	.000665	.000554	.000604	.000229
N	290	524	921	1,305	1,693	2,108	2,581	4,855

- **Interval:** whether the CoO and CoR have the same interval from one election to the next. No significant difference across groups with the same or different intervals

Table 10: TURNOUT BY ELECTION REGULARITY

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0931 (0.0561)	0.0855** (0.0384)	0.0658** (0.0282)	0.0470* (0.0249)	0.0334 (0.0233)	0.0219 (0.0213)	0.0206 (0.0199)	0.0105 (0.0124)
Regular Interval (CoR & CoO)	0.0358 (0.0561)	0.0380 (0.0389)	0.0101 (0.0323)	0.0359 (0.0283)	0.0355 (0.0249)	0.0304 (0.0228)	0.0247 (0.0199)	0.0167 (0.0154)
Post × Regular Interval	-0.0525 (0.0865)	-0.0418 (0.0650)	-0.0190 (0.0446)	-0.00844 (0.0370)	-0.0353 (0.0327)	-0.0211 (0.0304)	-0.0173 (0.0274)	-0.0127 (0.0191)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.57	.567	.563	.56	.56	.561	.566
R ²	.0128	.0122	.00771	.00654	.00202	.00151	.00115	.000408
N	290	524	921	1,305	1,693	2,108	2,581	4,855

- **Regular:** whether the CoO and CoR both have regular intervals from one election to the next. No significant difference across groups with regular or irregular intervals

Table 11: DROPPING SAME DAY ELECTIONS

	Drop Presidential				Drop Legislative			
	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0675* (0.0386)	0.0679** (0.0291)	0.0568*** (0.0203)	0.0426** (0.0179)	0.0713* (0.0404)	0.0732** (0.0300)	0.0607*** (0.0209)	0.0469** (0.0183)
Dep Var Mean	.566	.571	.566	.562	.569	.577	.57	.565
R ²	.0102	.0109	.00747	.00416	.0111	.0124	.00845	.00499
N	277	502	885	1,243	264	480	847	1,182

- Drop one election if both presidential and legislative elections take place on the same day
- Results remain statistically significant

Table 12: TURNOUT BY *N*-DAY WINDOWS (ONE ELECTION MATCH)

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0689* (0.0373)	0.0672** (0.0287)	0.0590*** (0.0206)	0.0422** (0.0180)	0.0163 (0.0171)	0.0129 (0.0152)	0.0123 (0.0144)	0.00198 (0.0102)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.571	.568	.563	.561	.56	.561	.564
R ²	.0109	.0109	.00817	.00415	.000628	.000401	.000367	9.82e-06
N	287	519	899	1,266	1,640	2,025	2,468	4,482


- Only match the closest CoR election (either before or after, not both) to the CoO election
- Results remain statistically significant

Table 13: TURNOUT BY *N*-DAY WINDOWS (ALL ELECTION ROUNDS)


	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0438 (0.0334)	0.0524** (0.0259)	0.0428** (0.0200)	0.0350** (0.0168)	0.0146 (0.0162)	0.0134 (0.0144)	0.0125 (0.0136)	0.00615 (0.00894)
Dep Var Mean	.57	.566	.562	.561	.561	.562	.562	.568
R ²	.00446	.00665	.00431	.00289	.000505	.000433	.000383	.0000947
N	340	584	986	1,372	1,759	2,182	2,668	4,932

- Match all CoR election rounds, including runoffs
- Results remain statistically significant


Figure 8: REMOVING COUNTRIES




(a) Country of Origin



(b) Country of Residence (1)



(c) Country of Residence (2)



(d) Country of Residence (3)

Table 14: ADDING CONTROLS (60-DAY WINDOW)


	CoR Turnout	CoO Turnout	Corruption	GDP	Trade	Employment	Remittances	Distance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0777*** (0.0286)	0.0556* (0.0300)	0.0622** (0.0295)	0.0615** (0.0287)	0.0785*** (0.0291)	0.0657** (0.0306)	0.0709** (0.0285)	0.0616** (0.0293)
Dep Var Mean	.574	.571	.571	.571	.565	.589	.571	.571
R ²	.0148	.081	.025	.0272	.028	.0136	.0217	.0615
N	503	522	515	522	498	426	501	520

- Control for some variables that were not ‘balanced’
- Results remain statistically significant

Table 15: BALANCE TEST USING CoO & CoR VARIABLES

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
CoO Turnout in CoR (lagged)	-0.030	-0.013	0.005	0.005	0.017	0.014	0.007	0.005
CoO: Domestic Turnout in CoO	0.005	0.016	0.012	0.005	0.001	-0.006	-0.005	-0.004
CoO: Net Migration Rate	-0.309	-0.109	-0.285	-0.159	0.006	-0.038	-0.047	-0.006
CoR: Net Migration Rate	-1.940	1.381	0.712	0.349	0.651	0.557	0.392	-0.223
CoO: Employment Rate	1.885*	1.422**	1.419***	0.961**	0.573	0.372	0.098	-0.205
CoR: Employment Rate	-1.026	-1.173	-0.824	-0.574	-0.573	-0.278	-0.115	0.198
CoO: Polity Score	0.063	-0.164	0.181	0.114	0.201	0.063	0.098	-0.015
CoR: Polity Score	0.658	-0.083	-0.329	-0.421	-0.233	-0.258	-0.309	-0.080
CoO: Corruption Perception Index	-1.740	-1.083	0.135	-0.407	0.316	0.422	0.616	-0.047
CoR: Corruption Perception Index	-4.062	-3.543	-2.100	-0.491	0.872	0.014	0.412	1.349
CoO: GDP per capita	217.141	1479.419	-273.553	-445.153	-462.156	-588.836	-175.720	-203.870
CoR: GDP per capita	-4257.453*	-3652.991*	-2064.871	-2120.428*	-526.301	-620.162	-206.552	1169.929*
CoO: Trade (% of GDP)	3.384	-2.039	-1.147	-2.504	-0.258	0.462	0.313	0.984
CoR: Trade (% of GDP)	-8.880*	0.422	-3.193	-1.415	1.015	1.242	1.697	1.491
CoO: Population (in Millions)	2.090	7.095	5.613*	4.178*	2.335	0.015	0.162	-1.128
CoR: Population (in Millions)	12.348	6.453	-2.315	0.681	-3.603	-1.741	-0.203	-1.304
CoO: Remittances (% of GDP)	-0.242	-0.821**	-0.251	-0.275	-0.207	-0.148	-0.171	0.068
CoR: Remittances (% of GDP)	0.982**	0.203	0.156	-0.119	-0.260	-0.148	-0.050	-0.216

Figure 10: ELECTION WINDOW BY WEEK (PLACEBO)



(a) On-Time

(b) Early or Late

- Results only significant for on-time elections, not planned elections that did not push through.

Table 16: TURNOUT USING RDD

	Bandwidth: CCT			Bandwidth: IK		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: CoO, CoR and Year Fixed Effects</i>						
Post-Election	0.0152*	0.0190*	0.0217*	0.0182**	0.0258**	0.0274**
	(0.00798)	(0.0105)	(0.0131)	(0.00916)	(0.0125)	(0.0138)
<i>Panel B: CoO-CoR Pair and Year Fixed Effects</i>						
Post-Election	0.0195**	0.0220**	0.0223**	0.0207**	0.0237*	0.0232*
	(0.00776)	(0.00933)	(0.0113)	(0.00920)	(0.0127)	(0.0132)
Dep Var Mean	.562	.562	.561	.564	.562	.562
Function	Linear	Quadratic	Cubic	Linear	Quadratic	Cubic
Bandwidth	826	1,182	1,516	617	807	1,178
N	9,934	12,759	14,407	8,026	9,822	12,752

- From event-study to RD: flexible function of the running variable
- Results robust to inclusion of CoO-CoR pair FE


Table 17: LOCAL ELECTIONS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Sample with Local Elections Only</i>								
Post-Election	-0.00750 (0.0532)	-0.0233 (0.0423)	-0.0114 (0.0305)	-0.00272 (0.0253)	-0.00845 (0.0245)	-0.0182 (0.0210)	-0.0243 (0.0189)	-0.0125 (0.0103)
Dep Var Mean	.594	.563	.566	.558	.564	.563	.561	.563
R ²	.000138	.00134	.000321	.0000179	.00017	.000797	.00147	.000375
N	179	292	528	677	827	1,079	1,336	2,622
<i>Panel B: Sample with Concurrent Local and National Elections</i>								
Post-Election	-0.00544 (0.0530)	-0.0225 (0.0423)	-0.00980 (0.0304)	-0.00161 (0.0252)	-0.00555 (0.0245)	-0.0155 (0.0209)	-0.0222 (0.0188)	-0.0117 (0.0103)
Concurrent (CoR)	-0.140** (0.0569)	-0.0797* (0.0457)	-0.104*** (0.0390)	-0.0497 (0.0347)	-0.0345 (0.0340)	-0.0329 (0.0286)	-0.0355 (0.0251)	-0.0497** (0.0225)
Post × Concurrent	0.123 (0.0875)	0.109 (0.0758)	0.120** (0.0523)	0.0572 (0.0487)	0.0261 (0.0455)	0.0264 (0.0350)	0.0354 (0.0348)	0.0466* (0.0265)
Dep Var Mean	.572	.555	.556	.554	.558	.558	.557	.557
R ²	.0261	.00848	.0117	.00274	.00119	.00122	.00165	.00227
N	236	402	685	890	1,095	1,406	1,760	3,421


- Local CoR elections do not impact migrant turnout

- Google Trends for CoO keywords, within a 60-day window of the CoR election, from 2004 to present
- For example, in the Philippines:
 - News Organization: Manila Times, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila Standard, Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star
 - Electoral Commission: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

Google Trends: News Organizations




Google Trends: Electoral Commission ◀



- From April 2013 to the present, parse URL to identify news organization and headline
- Coded the country headquarters or owner of the top 500 news organizations (comprising >50% of total news articles)
- Counted the number of articles in which the country name and elections are mentioned *together* in the headline
- Country name: {'filipino', 'philippine'}
- Elections: {'elect'} – {'select' ∪ 'electr'}

GDELT: Media Coverage of CoR Election by CoR vs. Non-CoR News Orgs



GDELT: Non-CoR Media Coverage for Close vs. Non-Close CoR Elections




Table 18: TURNOUT AND CLOSE ELECTIONS IN CoR & CoO

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	-0.108 (0.0893)	-0.119 (0.0722)	-0.0811 (0.0528)	-0.0796* (0.0412)	-0.0750* (0.0390)	-0.0552* (0.0334)	-0.0538* (0.0315)	-0.0188 (0.0184)
Close Election (CoO)	-0.172** (0.0824)	-0.155** (0.0649)	-0.119*** (0.0418)	-0.119*** (0.0386)	-0.110*** (0.0328)	-0.0964*** (0.0306)	-0.0857*** (0.0283)	-0.0458** (0.0206)
Close Election (CoR)	-0.0423 (0.0840)	-0.0191 (0.0634)	-0.0235 (0.0460)	-0.0107 (0.0363)	-0.0177 (0.0317)	-0.00973 (0.0284)	-0.0287 (0.0258)	-0.0230 (0.0194)
Post × Close Election (CoO)	0.201 (0.131)	0.248*** (0.0930)	0.129* (0.0662)	0.140*** (0.0523)	0.0992** (0.0411)	0.0669* (0.0380)	0.0620* (0.0374)	0.00256 (0.0239)
Post × Close Election (CoR)	0.239* (0.121)	0.207** (0.0907)	0.182*** (0.0695)	0.108* (0.0591)	0.0801 (0.0510)	0.0692 (0.0461)	0.0902** (0.0420)	0.0291 (0.0242)
Close Election (CoR & CoO)	0.0278 (0.116)	0.00411 (0.0829)	0.0174 (0.0605)	0.0171 (0.0512)	0.0453 (0.0449)	0.0331 (0.0404)	0.0421 (0.0380)	0.00886 (0.0285)
Post × Close Election (CoR & CoO)	-0.169 (0.176)	-0.191 (0.122)	-0.127 (0.0889)	-0.0444 (0.0765)	-0.0236 (0.0594)	-0.0159 (0.0594)	-0.0551 (0.0536)	0.0237 (0.0348)
Dep Var Mean	.558	.564	.564	.56	.558	.559	.561	.566
R ²	.063	.0586	.0383	.0257	.016	.0142	.0106	.00435
N	267	484	858	1,233	1,607	2,000	2,446	4,629

- Close CoR elections make migrants think they are pivotal in CoO elections
- Triple interaction not significant

Table 19: TURNOUT AND DUAL CITIZENSHIP

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0426 (0.0528)	0.0622 (0.0395)	0.0685** (0.0279)	0.0673*** (0.0229)	0.0411* (0.0211)	0.0332* (0.0188)	0.0380** (0.0167)	0.0113 (0.0106)
Dual (CoR & CoO)	-0.0184 (0.0533)	-0.0180 (0.0430)	0.00734 (0.0327)	0.00739 (0.0265)	0.0203 (0.0248)	0.0265 (0.0241)	0.0273 (0.0216)	0.0100 (0.0184)
Post × Dual	0.0634 (0.0790)	0.0102 (0.0608)	-0.0250 (0.0440)	-0.0547 (0.0352)	-0.0575* (0.0333)	-0.0478 (0.0301)	-0.0576** (0.0275)	-0.0153 (0.0177)
Dep Var Mean	.57	.571	.568	.564	.561	.561	.562	.567
R ²	.0148	.0115	.00817	.00691	.00271	.0017	.00238	.000209
N	289	523	920	1,304	1,691	2,107	2,580	4,856

- Laws only permit dual citizens of both countries to vote for national elections
- Turnout is not necessarily higher in CoO-CoR pairs that grant dual citizenship

Table 20: RETURN MIGRATION & REMITTANCES

	Migration				Remittances			
	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	2736.5 (2596.2)	2523.6 (2522.4)	1732.1 (1772.6)	747.0 (1178.1)	-17.14 (16.16)	-23.43 (17.60)	-5.539 (5.287)	-1.973 (5.443)
Dep Var Mean	2,159	2,347	1,932	1,834	22.8	26.7	28.3	26.4
R ²	.0148	.0112	.00807	.00193	.00463	.00749	.000403	.0000607
N	96	166	283	385	197	366	659	920

- Dissatisfaction with CoR elections encourage return home and remittances
- No significant increases in return migration rates or remittances

Table 21: TURNOUT AND DUAL CITIZENSHIP

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Anti-Immigration Issue in CoR Elections</i>								
Post-Election	0.157 (0.0981)	0.0365 (0.0704)	0.0416 (0.0689)	0.0806 (0.0686)	-0.00593 (0.0550)	0.00428 (0.0442)	0.0174 (0.0435)	-0.00181 (0.0268)
Issue: Anti-Immigration (CoR)	-0.156 (0.0936)	-0.125* (0.0716)	-0.149** (0.0648)	-0.0906* (0.0540)	-0.0957* (0.0494)	-0.0518 (0.0462)	-0.0341 (0.0409)	0.00252 (0.0303)
Post × Issue: Anti-Immigration	-0.111 (0.137)	0.116 (0.0983)	0.142 (0.0881)	0.0665 (0.0865)	0.108 (0.0727)	0.0928 (0.0576)	0.0532 (0.0565)	0.0190 (0.0359)
Dep Var Mean	.581	.578	.581	.589	.581	.581	.584	.596
R ²	.0978	.0352	.0452	.0329	.0143	.0105	.00627	.00703
N	83	141	233	311	407	518	627	1,197
<i>Panel B: Anti-Immigrant Winning Party in the CoR</i>								
Post-Election	0.108 (0.0676)	0.111** (0.0516)	0.0623 (0.0437)	-0.00222 (0.0426)	-0.0276 (0.0393)	-0.0352 (0.0360)	-0.0224 (0.0313)	-0.0121 (0.0166)
Anti-Immigrant Party (CoR)	0.0331 (0.0549)	0.0482 (0.0406)	0.0268 (0.0351)	-0.00715 (0.0293)	-0.00976 (0.0310)	-0.0235 (0.0291)	-0.0105 (0.0272)	-0.000846 (0.0211)
Post × Anti-Immigrant Party	-0.0536 (0.0808)	-0.0646 (0.0602)	-0.00181 (0.0483)	0.0580 (0.0464)	0.0553 (0.0443)	0.0594 (0.0404)	0.0485 (0.0350)	0.0252 (0.0202)
Dep Var Mean	.573	.571	.571	.565	.563	.563	.563	.568
R ²	.0121	.0116	.00972	.00645	.00236	.00183	.00191	.000653
N	266	489	866	1,231	1,606	2,003	2,451	4,633

- No significant difference in CoRs where immigration is a salient issue or with an anti-immigrant party

Table 22: CoO & CoR TURNOUT

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0498 (0.0582)	0.0805* (0.0420)	0.0891*** (0.0268)	0.0762*** (0.0242)	0.0257 (0.0212)	0.0156 (0.0190)	0.0117 (0.0195)	0.00454 (0.0130)
Turnout (CoR)	-0.000603 (0.0427)	-0.00562 (0.0316)	0.0129 (0.0264)	0.0438** (0.0214)	0.0137 (0.0193)	0.00594 (0.0175)	-0.00337 (0.0164)	-0.00411 (0.0153)
Post × Turnout	0.0394 (0.0751)	-0.00545 (0.0575)	-0.0515 (0.0401)	-0.0658* (0.0349)	-0.0182 (0.0293)	-0.00852 (0.0253)	-0.00126 (0.0245)	-0.00215 (0.0187)
Dep Var Mean	.57	.574	.569	.565	.562	.562	.562	.566
R ²	.0134	.0147	.0118	.00761	.000942	.000371	.000348	.000103
N	278	503	888	1,250	1,620	2,017	2,469	4,642

- When migrants are surrounded by others who have expressed voting intentions or have actually voted, this can lead them to turn out
- Higher CoR turnout is not a significant driver of increased CoO turnout

Table 23: UNCERTAINTY

	Sample with Data				Same Ideology			
	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	-0.0195 (0.0667)	-0.0271 (0.0541)	-0.00699 (0.0417)	-0.00807 (0.0356)	-0.0554 (0.0808)	-0.0579 (0.0642)	-0.0320 (0.0477)	-0.0160 (0.0435)
Close Election (CoR)	-0.0427 (0.0529)	-0.0177 (0.0421)	-0.0109 (0.0360)	0.000409 (0.0270)	-0.0471 (0.0688)	-0.0345 (0.0548)	-0.0254 (0.0443)	-0.00882 (0.0326)
Post × Close Election	0.142* (0.0857)	0.130** (0.0632)	0.104** (0.0512)	0.0876* (0.0459)	0.157 (0.106)	0.170** (0.0783)	0.143** (0.0618)	0.116** (0.0557)
Dep Var Mean	.574	.572	.574	.567	.561	.558	.574	.567
R ²	.0215	.0206	.0176	.0132	.0173	.0247	.0219	.0182
N	240	440	775	1,111	180	318	579	828

- No clear winner in close elections, making them salient and unpredictable
- Limiting sample to elections where contenders share the same ideology leads to same result