

Life out of the shadows: Impacts of regularization programs in the lives of refugees

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
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Teaching Materials

Forced Displacement is a Global Challenge



- **37.6m** refugees worldwide by the end of 2023
- This population has more than doubled in the last decade, **117.3m** forcibly displaced in 2023

Migratory Regularization

- Migratory regularization program \neq amnesties.
- Processes designed to confer specific rights and benefits to certain categories of international migrants for a limited period.
- Typically enacted through administrative decrees or executive orders due to economic or humanitarian reasons.
- Enables forced migrants residing without proper authorization to regularize their status.

This Paper

We identify the impact of a regularization program for undocumented Venezuelan forced migrants:

- ① Socioeconomic Well-being: consumption, labor income, health status
- ② Access to state services
- ③ Labor market outcomes
- ④ Mechanisms: mediation analysis
- ⑤ Cost-effectiveness

Identification Strategy: Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design

RDD Motivation

- The Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos (RAMV) was a census conducted to estimate the number of irregular Venezuelan forced migrants in Colombia.
- In August 2018, Colombia's president **unexpectedly** announced that all Venezuelan forced migrants who had registered in RAMV could regularize their status by applying for the Permiso Especial de Permanencia (PEP).
- The RAMV registry was open from April 6 to June 8, 2018.
- Forced migrants who arrived in Colombia after June 8 were ineligible for RAMV registration and thus could not apply for PEP.

We compare eligible and ineligible migrants around the RAMV cutoff date.

Summary of Results

- Higher overall socioeconomic well-being.
- Greater overall access to state services.
- No significant effect on labor market outcomes.
- The effect on socioeconomic well-being is primarily mediated by access to state services.
- Reduction in Fiscal Burden.

Related Literature

Existing Evidence on the Effect of Migrant Regularization Programs

- Reduction in migrant poverty rates and increases in consumption (Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman 2017, Dustmann, Fasani and Speciale 2017)
- Positive impact on migrant fertility decisions (Kuka, Shenhav and Shih 2019, Lanari, Pieroni and Salmasi 2020)
- Mixed results on migrant education (Kuka, Shenhav and Shih 2019, Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman 2017, Hsin and Ortega 2018)
- Small negative effects on workers who compete with newly legalized migrant workers (Bahar, Ibáñez and Rozo 2021)
- Crime reduction among program beneficiaries (Baker 2015, Mastrobuoni and Pinotti 2015, Pinotti 2017)
- Increase in payroll tax revenues (Monras, Vazquez-Grenno and Elias 2020)
- Augmentation in firm creation (Bahar, Cowgill and Guzman 2023)

Contribution on Existing Evidence

- 1 This study examines the effects of integrating forced migrants in a developing country context, marked by high informality, limited fiscal resources, and hosting 76% of the world's forcibly displaced populations ([UNHCR 2022](#)).
- 2 It examines the implications of integrating forced migrants into social protection schemes, offering a sustainable, development-oriented alternative to humanitarian aid ([Moya and Rozo, 2024](#)).
- 3 The study collects data from a hard-to-reach population, providing novel insights into this demographic.
- 4 Cost-benefit analysis illustrates the short-term fiscal benefits of the program.
- 5 The focus is specifically on forced migrants, as opposed to voluntary migrants, highlighting the unique challenges and opportunities within this subgroup.


Outline

- ① Context: The PEP Program
- ② Study Design
- ③ Empirical Strategy
- ④ Results
- ⑤ Fiscal Net Costs
- ⑥ Conclusion

Context: The Regularization Program Permiso Especial de Permanencia (PEP)

Venezuelan Refugee Crisis

- By June 2024:
7.77M Venezuelan forced migrants
2.8M in Colombia
Source: UNHCR



Massive Regularization in 2018



Registro administrativo
De Migrantes Venezolanos
(RAMV)

April 6th to June 8th, 2018



441

municipalities



442,464

individuals



253,375

households



Permiso Especial de
Permanencia
(PEP)


August 2nd to December 21st, 2018



281,803

individuals

PEP was a Generous Program



Study Design

The Venezuelan Refugee Panel Survey (VenRePS)



Control: irregular migrants



Treatment: PEP-RAMV

- **Eligible forced migrants:** RAMV-Census (from here RAMV migrants)
- **Ineligible forced migrants:** Referrals from RAMV refugees and databases from refugee organizations (from here non-RAMV migrants)
- **Sample:** Ven. forced migrants, 18+, arriving between Jan 2017-Dec 2018.

Sample and Data Collection



Cities:

- **Big cities:** Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín
- **Small cities:** Cúcuta, Villa del Rosario, Cali, Cartagena, Riohacha, Maicao, Uribia, Valledupar, Santa Marta and Arauca



Size: 2,232 refugee families

- Eligible (RAMV): 1,110
- Ineligible (Non-RAMV): 1,122



Phone surveys by Venezuelan enumerators



Language modified to Venezuelan day-to-day common words

Questionnaire Modules

- ① Sociodemographic module.
- ② RAMV and PEP registration processes module.
- ③ Labor module (we followed the Colombian Labor Force Survey (GEIH)).
- ④ Health and access to healthcare module.
- ⑤ Household level questions (we include questions on (i) migration, (ii) integration into Colombian society, (iii) prosocial preferences, (iv) housing, and (v) expenditures and remittances).

Outcomes

● Primary Outcomes:

- ① Socioeconomic well-being: Encompasses consumption, income, and a health status index.
- ② Access to services: Includes registration in Sisbén (the proxy means-testing system), and access to subsidized healthcare, financial products, and government transfers.
- ③ Labor Market: Includes employment, holding a formal job, quality of employment (measured as the inverse of the willingness to find a different job), and having salaried employment (as opposed to self-employment).

● Secondary Outcomes:

- ① Migration Intentions: Encompasses the intention to stay in Colombia, return to Venezuela, or move to another country.
- ② Integration: Encompasses inclusion in Colombian society and the neighborhood, whether the forced migrant has Colombian friends, and whether they have experienced discrimination in Colombia.
- ③ Prosocial Behavior: Includes general trust in people, trust in Colombians, trust in Venezuelans, and trust in the Colombian government.

Descriptive Analysis

Descriptive Statistics – Primary Outcomes

	RAMV (1)	Non-RAMV (2)	Mean diff.	
			P-value (3)	Bonferroni P-value (4)
<i>A. Socioeconomic Well-being</i>				
Well-being (Index)	0.462 (1.076)	0.005 (1.011)	0.000	0.000
<i>B. Service Access</i>				
Service Access (Index)	0.302 (0.279)	0.033 (0.093)	0.000	0.000
<i>C. Labor Outcomes</i>				
Labor Outcomes (Index)	0.346 (0.321)	0.240 (0.272)	0.000	0.000

Sociodemographic Variables - Balance

	RAMV (1)	Non-RAMV (2)	Mean diff.	
			P-value (3)	Bonferroni P-value (4)
Female [=1]	0.505 (0.500)	0.589 (0.492)	0.000	0.000
Age (years)	34.028 (10.193)	29.963 (11.612)	0.000	0.000
Number of Venezuelan children	1.461 (1.496)	1.657 (1.490)	0.000	0.000
Years of education before migration	13.516 (2.732)	12.9 (2.940)	0.000	0.000
Migrated for health reasons	0.108 (0.311)	0.097 (0.296)	0.265	1.000
Time in Colombia (months)	27.52 (10.952)	20.119 (8.828)	0.000	0.000
Friends or family in Colombia before migration	0.703 (0.457)	0.752 (0.432)	0.001	0.021

- Eligible and non-eligible migrants were otherwise similar across a range of current and pre-migration characteristics.
- Balance of all variables is shown in [Appendix Balance](#)

Reason for Not Registering in RAMV

	Non-RAMV Referrals (1)	Non-RAMV Organizations (2)
Did not know about RAMV	50.11%	53.39%
Was not in Colombia	15.01%	18.17%
No proof of Ven. nationality	1.10%	1.65%
Was working	15.45%	13.39%
Too expensive or complicated	1.99%	2.20%
Fear of deportation	7.06%	6.24%
Other	9.27%	4.95%

- The decision to not register in RAMV stemmed from a lack of information, a lack of proof of Venezuelan nationality, and an inability to take time off from income-generating activities.

Reason for Not Having PEP

	Non-RAMV Referrals (1)	Non-RAMV Organizations (2)	RAMV No PEP (3)
Lack or information or misinformation	31.10%	26.86%	11.59%
RAMV registration got lost	6.04%	7.62%	23.19%
Did not have Passport	27.07%	32.48%	19.57%
Did not have access to Internet	1.90%	1.43%	5.8%
Did not plan to stay in Colombia	5.26%	3.62%	–
Did not need it	0.45%	0.57%	0.72%
Did not register in RAMV Census	11.07%	11.14%	–
Was not in Colombia	10.63%	12.57%	2.17%
Other	6.49%	3.71%	36.96%

- The decision to not register in PEP includes lack of information and loss of proof of RAMV registration, which was sent to registered email accounts.

The Qualitative Study



Conclusions from the Qualitative Surveys

- ① Mistrust and fear of being deported affected willingness for take-up
- ② Prior networks before migrating affected willingness for take-up (opposite direction)
- ③ Local authorities/NGOs produce information in a language difficult to understand

Confounding Factors

- Reasons for not registering in RAMV and PEP suggests potential confounding factors.
- These characteristics might correlate with the outcomes of interest and with unobserved factors such as connections to relevant networks and entrepreneurship.
- Simple comparisons between RAMV and non-RAMV migrants would produce biased estimates of PEP's effects.

Empirical Strategy

Identification Strategy: Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design

- The fuzzy RDD exploits the discontinuity in the likelihood of receiving PEP based on the RAMV cutoff date.
- Only forced migrants who had registered in RAMV were eligible to apply for PEP.
- The RAMV registry was open between April 6 and June 8 of 2018.
- Forced migrants who arrived in Colombia after June 8 could not register in RAMV and thus were ineligible for PEP.

Identification Strategy: Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design


The fuzzy RDD compares eligible and ineligible migrants on each side of the RAMV cutoff date under the following two-stage specification:

$$\mathbb{1}[PEP_i = 1] = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \mathbb{1}[T_i < \bar{T}] + \beta_3 f(d_i) + \theta' X_{ij} + \gamma' Z_j + \phi + \epsilon_{ij}$$

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \mathbb{1}[\widehat{PEP}_i = 1] + \alpha_3 f(d_i) + \omega' X_{ij} + \Psi' Z_j + \phi + \mu_{ij}$$

- Y_{ij} : predicted likelihood of having PEP.
- $\mathbb{1}[PEP_i = 1]$: indicator variable [=1] for migrants with PEP.
- T_i and \bar{T} are the date of arrival in Colombia and the date when the RAMV registry closed.
- $\mathbb{1}[T_i < \bar{T}]$: indicator variable [=1] if the migrant arrived in Colombia when the registry was still open.
- d_i is the distance measured in days between the migrant's arrival date and June 8, 2018 ($d_i = T_i - \bar{T}$)
- $f(d_i)$ is a local linear polynomial of the running variable.
- X_{ij} and Z_j are vectors of baseline individual and household controls.

Empirical Design: Fuzzy RDD




— Probability of treatment (left)


■ Families by week of arrival
[McCrary test p-value: 0.992]

* Observations grouped by week of arrival

The Empirical Design (cont'd): Fuzzy RDD




Validity of the Local Continuity Assumption



Notes: This table tests the validity of the local continuity assumption in all the baseline covariates used as controls in all the specifications. The controls are defined as dependant variables in a sharp RD estimation. The estimation uses a triangular kernel and a common MSERD optimal bandwidth.

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Results

Results

PEP's Impact on Primary Outcomes

- ① **Socioeconomic Well-being:** PEP had a positive impact of 1.65 sd on migrants socioeconomic well-being
- ② **Access to state services:** PEP had a positive impact of 38 pp on overall access to state services
- ③ **Labor market outcomes:** PEP had a positive but imprecisely estimated impacts.

Impacts of PEP on Socioeconomic Well-being

	Well-being Index (1)	Labor Income (log) (2)	Consumption per Capita (log) (3)	Health Status (Index) (4)
<i>A. Second Stage</i>				
$1[\text{PEP}_i = 1]$	1.655*** (0.462)	0.221** (0.107)	0.481** (0.181)	1.201** (0.460)
FDR q-values	[0.001]	[0.013]	[0.010]	[0.010]
<i>B. First Stage</i>				
$1[\text{T}_i < \bar{\text{T}}]$	0.369*** (0.062)	0.401*** (0.061)	0.363*** (0.083)	0.362*** (0.064)
Obs. left	411	255	476	377
Obs. right	731	569	1036	701
Observations	3,423	1,819	3,801	3,422
Mean values (Non-RAMV)	0.000	0.351	1.373	0.000
Outcome Level	Individual	Individual	Household	Individual

- More per capita consumption (\uparrow 48%)
- Increased labor income (\uparrow 22%)
- Improved health status index (\uparrow 1.2 sd)

Impacts of PEP on Access to State and Private Services

	Service Access (Index) (1)	Sisbén (2)	Subsidized Healthcare (3)	Financial Products (4)	Transfers from Government (5)
<i>A. Second Stage</i>					
$1[PEP_i = 1]$	0.382*** (0.079)	0.567*** (0.127)	0.267*** (0.118)	0.444*** (0.110)	0.221*** (0.097)
FDR q-values	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.010]
<i>B. First Stage</i>					
$1[T_i < \bar{T}]$	0.338*** (0.067)	0.395*** (0.061)	0.353*** (0.063)	0.398*** (0.061)	0.414*** (0.059)
Obs. left	363	467	429	466	539
Obs. right	655	990	764	992	1169
Observations	3,424	3,781	3,375	3,795	3,799
Mean values (Non-RAMV)	0.033	0.023	0.015	0.030	0.065
Outcome Level	Individual	Household	Individual	Household	Household

- Increased likelihood of enrollment in the Sisbén (↑ 57 pp)
- Improved access to the subsidized healthcare system (↑ 27 pp)
- Higher likelihood of having a bank account (↑ 44 pp)
- Increased receipt of government transfers (↑ 22 pp)

Impacts of PEP on Labor Outcomes

	Labor Outcomes (Index) (1)	Employment (2)	Formal Employment (3)	Salaried Worker (4)	Quality of Employment (5)
<i>A. Second Stage</i>					
$1[\text{PEP}_i = 1]$	0.253 (0.148)	0.261 (0.248)	0.108 (0.107)	0.471 (0.263)	0.119 (0.248)
FDR q-values	[0.283]	[0.302]	[0.302]	[0.283]	[0.611]
<i>B. First Stage</i>					
$1[T_i < \bar{T}]$	0.364*** (0.063)	0.366*** (0.063)	0.405*** (0.074)	0.396*** (0.079)	0.395*** (0.078)
Obs. left	379	401	267	243	255
Obs. right	706	710	635	526	574
Observations	3,424	3,424	2,048	2,034	2,048
Mean values (Non-RAMV)	0.266	0.561	0.001	0.570	0.324
Outcome Level	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual

- Positive but imprecisely estimated impacts on the likelihood of employment, having formal employment, being a salaried worker, and employment quality.

Results

PEP's Impact on Secondary Outcomes

- ① **Migration Intentions:** No statistically significant effect
- ② **Integration:**
 - Decrease in the number of Colombian friends (\downarrow 7.4 pp)
 - Decrease in the reported instances of discrimination against Venezuelan forced migrants (\downarrow 62 %)
- ③ **Prosocial Behavior:**
 - Positive effect on migrants' trust in other Venezuelans in Colombia (\uparrow 88 pp)

Robustness Tests

- ① Multiple Hypothesis testing
- ② Without Controls
- ③ Different bandwidths
- ④ Different polynomial order
- ⑤ Different kernel specification

Robustness tests are detailed in Appendix L of the main document.

Unpacking The Mechanisms of Impact

Average Controlled Direct Effect

To determine whether access to state services, labor income, or both drive PEP's impact on forced migrants' well-being, we follow Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016) to estimate the average controlled direct effect (ACDE).

The ACDE corresponds to the effect of PEP on well-being once we partial out the effect of the two mechanisms (state services and labor outcomes)

Average Controlled Direct Effect


The ACDE is estimated using two-stage model:

$$Y_{ij} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \mathbb{1}[T_i < \bar{T}]_{ij} + \delta_2 \text{Access to Services Index}_{ij} + \delta_3 \text{Labor Market Index}_{ij} + \lambda X_i' + \beta Z_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

$$\hat{Y}_{ij} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \mathbb{1}[T_i < \bar{T}]_{ij} + \theta X_i' + v_{ij}$$


- Y_{ij} is the well-being index
- $\mathbb{1}[T_i < \bar{T}]_{ij}$ is an indicator [=1] for Venezuelan forced migrants who were eligible for PEP
- Access to Services Index_{ij} and Labor Market Index_{ij} are the potential mediator factors
- X_i' and Z_j' are the same matrices of individual and household covariates used in the main analysis.
- \hat{Y}_{ij} is the de-mediated well-being index [$\hat{Y}_{ij} = Y_{ij} - (\hat{\alpha}_2 \text{Access to Services Index}_{ij} + \hat{\alpha}_3 \text{Labor Market Index}_{ij})$]
- v_{ij} is the error term estimated through bootstrapping.

Mediation Analysis



- Once we account for the impact of access to services and labor outcomes, the ACDE is not statistically different from zero.
- These two mechanisms explain the positive impact on socioeconomic well-being.
- Improved access to services plays a more pronounced role compared to gains in labor market outcomes.

Mediation Analysis - Service Access



- Sisbén registration, subsidized healthcare access, and financial product access primarily drive PEP's impact on well-being.

Mediation Analysis are Consistent with the Qualitative Evidence

- ① Forced migrants in focus groups reported that access to services provided "peace of mind" and allowed them to focus beyond immediate needs.
- ② Access to Sisbén and subsidized healthcare improved health, well-being, and economic productivity. services reduced out-of-pocket health expenses, influencing consumption patterns.
- ③ Financial services facilitated socioeconomic integration by enabling access to job sectors requiring bank accounts.
- ④ Sisbén enrollment was crucial for receiving monthly transfers from the "Ingreso Solidario" program during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Cost-Benefit Analysis and Service Overcrowding

Fiscal Net Cost

- Large positive effects on well-being may lead to significant fiscal costs and overcrowding of public services and the labor market.
- We report the results of a short-run cost-benefit analysis of PEP.
- We examine potential negative impacts on hosts and non-PEP migrants due to overcrowded services and labor market shifts.
- We use data from firm capital tax contributions ([Clemens, 2021](#)) and firm creation ([Bahar et al., 2023](#)).

Fiscal Cost Analysis - Assumptions

- **Cost:**

- ① Provision of Public Services and Social Assistance:

Cost vary by:

- Migratory status (PEP or Non-PEP)
- Age profiles
- Rates of job formality

- ② Reference Migrant Household Costs:

- Based on average socioeconomic and demographic profiles in the sample.
- For PEP migrants, costs consider whether household adults have formal jobs, as formal workers pay payroll taxes.

- **Simulated Scenarios:**

- ① Universal Access: As mandated by Colombian law.

- ② Reported Access Rates: Based on our survey, providing a more accurate reflection of reality.

Fiscal Revenue - Assumptions

- **Tax Revenue:**

- ① Value-added taxes (VAT):

- Calculated using average per-capita consumption for each group.
 - Applied to every member of the representative household regardless of age.

- ② Payroll Taxes:

- Paid by PEP migrants with formal employment based on average income levels.

Fiscal Net Costs from Regularization for a Representative Household

	Universal Access Rates (<i>De Jure</i>)			
	Without PEP (1)	PEP Informal (2)	PEP Formal (3)	PEP 10% Formal (4)
Net Fiscal Cost by HH member:				
Head	-282.64	-51.20	769.77	30.89
Partner	-282.64	-51.20	769.77	30.89
Child 0-5 years of age	-656.55	-466.35	-444.02	-464.12
Child 6-18 years of age	-1,330.69	-1,206.31	-522.88	-1,137.96
Total	-2,552.52	-1,775.06	572.64	-1,540.29
Net Fiscal Cost by accounting item:				
Fiscal Revenue	498.00	693.59	3,109.59	935.19
Expenditure	3,050.52	2,468.65	2,536.95	2,475.48
<i>Healthcare</i>	1,651.63	921.48	989.78	928.31
<i>Education</i>	1,048.05	1,048.05	1,048.05	1,048.05
<i>Social Assistance</i>	350.83	499.12	499.12	499.12

- Under the assumption of universal access to services, we find that a non-PEP migrant household has a net annual cost of \$USD 2,552 while a PEP formal household has an annual cost of \$USD -572, a decrease of 122%.

Fiscal Net Costs from Regularization for a Representative Household

	In Sample Access Rates (<i>De Facto</i>)			
	Without PEP (1)	PEP Informal (2)	PEP Formal (3)	PEP 10% Formal (4)
Net Fiscal Cost by HH member:				
Head	-95.27	41.65	869.68	124.45
Partner	-95.27	41.65	869.68	124.45
Child 0-5 years of age	-152.89	-88.63	-59.24	-85.70
Child 6-18 years of age	-712.50	-842.19	-812.80	-773.14
Total	-1,055.93	-847.53	867.31	-609.94
Net Fiscal Cost by accounting item:				
Fiscal Revenue	498.00	693.59	2,448.50	935.19
Expenditure	1,553.93	1,541.12	1,581.18	1,545.13
<i>Healthcare</i>	898.11	545.75	585.82	549.76
<i>Education</i>	617.23	883.56	883.56	883.56
<i>Social Assistance</i>	38.59	111.81	111.81	111.81

- Net Annual Costs: Non-PEP households have a net annual cost of \$1,056, while PEP households average \$610.
- Cost Reduction: Regularization reduces the net annual fiscal cost of hosting a Venezuelan migrant by 42%.
- Revenue Increase: The primary factor is the increase in fiscal revenue.
- Fiscal Impact: Comparing non-PEP households to partially formal PEP households, fiscal revenue rises by \$437 (88%) due to higher VAT from increased consumption and payroll taxes from formal workers.

Potential Overcrowding

Should we be concerned that PEP led to service overcrowding potentially affecting quality and having negative effects on hosts?

- Labor Market: PEP has negligible short-term effects on Colombian workers' employment and salaries ([Bahar, Ibáñez, Rozo 2021](#)).
- Health Services: Initial negative spillovers due to overcrowding, but improved health and preventive care for PEP migrants may offset this ([Ibáñez, Rozo, Urbina 2021](#)).
- Fiscal Analysis: Regularized forced migrants incur in lower health costs than undocumented ones due to better use of preventive services.
- PEP reduces short-term fiscal costs compared to excluding forced migrants from labor and social systems.
- Economic Contribution: PEP migrants contribute through payroll, value-added, and income taxes, and efficient healthcare use ([Monras, Vazquez-Grenno, Elias 2020](#).)

Conclusions

Conclusions

- ① **PEP improved Socioeconomic Well-Being:**
Higher consumption, labor income, and health status. Consumption increase from CCTS in Colombia, Mexico, and Indonesia: 0-15% ([Attanasio and Mesnard, 2006](#); [Angelucci and Attanasio, 2009](#); [Cahyadi et al., 2020](#))
- ② **Better Access to State Services:**
Improved access to Sisbén, subsidized health services, and financial products.
- ③ **Reduced Fiscal Burden:**
Regularized households are fiscally less burdensome due to increased consumption and income and lower health service costs compared to emergency services.
- ④ **No Effect on Formalization Rates**
- ⑤ **Program Impact Estimates Represent a Lower Bound**
- ⑥ **Future Research:**
Focus on similar regularization schemes' impact on international migration flows and migrant decisions to stay or leave.

PEP partially helps workers to enter formal labour markets and improves their work conditions.

“

"We would wake up at 5 am and at 5:30 am we were in the mountains. At 7 pm, when it was already dark, we were just finishing, covered in mud, wet because even if it rained we did not stop [...] that was the hardest part of this story. Being without a document is very hard. You always lose"

Irregular man in Medellín

(about his experience as a rural wage worker)

“

"We have tried to get the language academy started but many doors have closed to us because we are Venezuelan. Many people have told us they are not willing to hire Venezuelans"

(Man with PEP in Bogotá)




**LIFE OUT OF
SHADOWS**

Migrants with PEP feel more integrated
to society

“

“There is a change because when the police stops me and they ask me: “you are Venezuelan, do you have a PEP?” When I show them my PEP their attitude changes, I mean their face changes, in the sense that they say “ah, you are legal, you can go.”

(Woman with PEP in Barranquilla)



Thank you!

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Appendix

Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables

	RAMV (1)	Non-RAMV (2)	Mean diff.	
			P-value (3)	Bonferroni P-value (4)
Ever worked in Venezuela [=1]	0.984 (0.127)	0.971 (0.167)	0.013	0.273
Employed at private firm in Venezuela [=1]	0.61 (0.488)	0.583 (0.493)	0.111	1.000
Employed with Government in Venezuela [=1]	0.15 (0.357)	0.154 (0.361)	0.734	1.000
Self-employed or employee in Venezuela [=1]	0.188 (0.391)	0.171 (0.377)	0.210	1.000
Had a written contract in Venezuela [=1]	0.519 (0.500)	0.414 (0.493)	0.000	0.000
Knew of job opportunity before migrating [=1]	0.343 (0.475)	0.346 (0.476)	0.890	1.000
Gap between last job and migration (months)	1.054 (4.399)	0.739 (3.321)	0.018	0.378

Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables

	RAMV (1)	Non-RAMV (2)	Mean diff.	
			P-value (3)	Bonferroni P-value (4)
Had smartphone in Venezuela [=1]	0.647 (0.478)	0.503 (0.500)	0.000	0.000
Had a dwelling in Venezuela [=1]	0.866 (0.341)	0.864 (0.343)	0.890	1.000
Had electricity in Venezuela [=1]	0.994 (0.080)	0.994 (0.075)	0.759	1.000
Had running water in Venezuela [=1]	0.875 (0.331)	0.855 (0.352)	0.075	1.000
Had sewage in Venezuela [=1]	0.937 (0.244)	0.93 (0.256)	0.388	1.000
Lived in Venezuela with parents or siblings [=1]	0.421 (0.494)	0.465 (0.499)	0.008	0.168
Lived in Venezuela with partner or spouse [=1]	0.586 (0.493)	0.526 (0.499)	0.000	0.000