

Political Identity: Experimental Evidence on Anti-Americanism in Pakistan

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Motivation

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- ▶ This may play a role in behaviors from turning out to vote, to engaging in ethnic or nationalistic politics.
- ▶ Despite the intuitive appeal of **identity-based, intrinsic motives for political behavior**, separating their role from **consequential** and **social motives** is challenging

Consider the act of voting...

- ▶ May be shaped by intrinsic motives (e.g., Fiorina, 1976; Fearon, 1999; Pons and Tricaud, 2017)
- ▶ Difficult to tease these apart from possible consequential motives deriving from incorrect perceptions of pivotality (Duffy and Tavits, 2008) or from social considerations (e.g., Gerber, Green and Larimer, 2008; Funk, 2010; DellaVigna et al., 2016)

Political Identity

- ▶ In the absence of instrumental incentives, in the absence of social costs and benefits, are individuals willing to pay a cost to express a political view solely out of intrinsic motives, that is, to preserve their “sense of self”? (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000)

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- ▶ To what extent is it driven by self-image concerns as opposed to instrumental or social motives?

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- ▶ Clearly, some Pakistanis maintain anti-American political attitudes, but measurement remains challenging and motivations are unclear
- ▶ To what extent is it driven by self-image concerns as opposed to instrumental or social motives?
- ▶ **Why study this motive?**
 - ▶ Theory
 - ▶ Policy (Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin, 2019)

Empirical Challenge

To identify individuals for whom self-image maintenance drives political expression, one needs to study behavior in which:

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Important to study behavior that is elicited “naturally”; but difficult to have both sharp design *and* natural elicitation:

- ▶ “Lost letter” technique (Milgram, 1977) natural, but difficult to interpret
- ▶ Lab experiments (e.g., Kamenica and Brad, 2014) sharply designed, but behavior is framed, and necessarily shaped by social considerations (i.e., experimenter’s observation)

This Paper

- ▶ Two-part investigation:
- ▶ **Experiment #1:** Implement an *indirect* method of eliciting *identity-motivated* political expression, based on *revealed preference*; and also study how incentives affect expression
 - ▶ How expression responds to changes in the private financial cost
 - ▶ How it responds to changes in social context

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 - ▶ How expression responds to changes in the private financial cost
 - ▶ How it responds to changes in social context
- ▶ **Experiment #2:** Take this method to a new setting
 - ▶ Demonstrate a survey-ready adaptation of the method
 - ▶ Predict behavior:
 - ▶ Examine the association between anti-American identity and membership in the PTI, a major anti-American political party

Outline

I. Introduction

II. Summary and Preview of Results

III. Experiment #1 - Eliciting Political Identity

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- ▶ Intervention of interest occurred *after* subjects had completed a Big 5 personality survey, *unbeknownst to them*
- ▶ In return for completing the survey, study participants could elect to receive a “bonus” payment (above a show-up fee they had received upon arrival)
- ▶ Receiving the bonus payment required checking a box:
 - ▶ **Accept:** “I gratefully thank the [funding agency] for its generosity and I accept the bonus payment offer.”
 - ▶ **Reject:** “I choose not to accept the bonus payment offer.”

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 - ▶ 100 Pakistani Rupees (Rs) or 500 Rs
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- ▶ **The expectation of privacy**
 - ▶ Public expectation or private expectation (details to come)

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Using our methodology:

- ▶ Trivial consequential outcomes outside the study from checking either box
- ▶ Subjects had 100% anonymity, and choice did not seem to be focus of study, so no social pressure in the private condition
- ▶ Subjects reject payment only if the value of preserving an Anti-American identity exceeds the financial cost to them
 - ▶ Particularly clean after differencing out rejection of the LUMS offer

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 - ▶ Anti-American individuals with strong *self-image* concerns exhibit *social image* concerns that work in the opposite direction
- ▶ Around 10% of subjects are willing to forgo a 500 Rs payment from the U.S. (in private)
 - ▶ Even among those with strongly-held anti-American views, there is a downward-sloping demand curve

Experiment #2

- ▶ Replicates main design (bonus payment offer from the U.S. government) using a new technology (tablets), in another field location
- ▶ Links rejection of bonus payment offers to individuals' actual political party affiliations

Preview of Results: Experiment #2

- ▶ Broadly similar rejection rates: 34%
- ▶ Rejection is a strong predictor of membership in the primary anti-American party
 - ▶ Stated anti-Americanism does not correlate with membership

Related Literature

1. Economic research on culture, identity, and ideology:
 - ▶ ? : private costs to maintain identity; ? : strongly held religious beliefs
 - ▶ ? : sources of variation in political preferences
2. Economic research on motivations for political behavior
 - ▶ E.g., ?, ?, ???
3. Political science research on measurement of attitudes:
 - ▶ E.g., ???
4. The political economy of areas with conflict, in particular Central Asia and the Islamic World:
 - ▶ ? on terrorism
 - ▶ ? : impact of aid on Afghans' political views
 - ▶ Berman, Callen, Gibson, Long, and Rezaee (2019): clean elections and perceptions of government legitimacy

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Timeline and Site Selection

- ▶ Pilot: June 24-25, 2013 (Islamabad and Peshawar), 143 subjects
- ▶ Main study: July 7-16 simultaneously in three cities
- ▶ No foreigners directly involved in the implementation
- ▶ Areas either directly affected by U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan (Peshawar) or cities with substantial numbers of migrants from these areas (Islamabad and Dera Ghazi Khan)
- ▶ Sample: 1,152 Pakistani men

Map of Locations




Figure: Map of Locations

Recruitment, Screening, and Enrollment

- ▶ Screening for literacy:
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 - ▶ Enrollment one by one at enrollment desk in random order (second literacy test then)
 - ▶ Subject numbers for lab stations also in random order, given a chit numbered 1-24 from a shuffled deck
 - ▶ 24 subjects per room, 24 versions of the survey

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- ▶ End of session: subjects exited building immediately, bussed off site, no interaction with subjects waiting to participate

Picture of Implementation (1)




Figure: Enrollment Desk in Islamabad

Picture of Implementation (2)



Figure: Experimental Session in Peshawar

Experiment Overview

Each activity in one envelope that had to be closed and placed below the chair when finished; subjects not allowed to open envelopes from previous activities

1. Envelope 1: demographic questions, Big Five, and show-up fee of 300 Rs
2. **Envelope 2:** main intervention—bonus payment decision
3. Envelope 3: incentivized views of others' decisions, # of known subjects, and list experiment
4. Envelope 4: stated views on U.S. and Japan

Main Intervention – Funding Source and Payment Amount

Envelope 2 contained a piece of paper with the following text printed on it:

“Thank you for completing the survey. In return for completing the survey, we can offer you a bonus payment. Funding for the bonus payment comes from {*Funding Agency*}. We can pay you {*Amount*} for completing the survey, but in order to receive the bonus payment you are required to acknowledge receipt of the funds provided by {*Funding Agency*} and thank the funder. If you choose not to accept the payment, you will forgo the bonus payment of {*Amount*}, but not the payment of 300 Rs. for your participation.”

- ▶ Agency: U.S. government or LUMS
- ▶ Amount: 100 Rs or 500 Rs

Main Intervention: Public Decision

“If you choose to accept the bonus payment, in order to receive this additional payment, you will be asked to turn the letter in to the survey coordinator in the front of the room, so other participants will see you turn in the letter. Once you have made your decision on the next page, please place the letter into envelope 2, whether or not you chose to accept the bonus payment.”

- ▶ Deception concerns traded off against safety concerns: all that was written was true, but no one's choice was actually observable

Main Intervention: Private Decision

“If you choose to accept the bonus payment, your decision will be **completely private**; in order to receive this additional payment; you will simply replace the letter in envelope 2 and submit it with your other survey materials at the end of the study, so no other participants will know your choice. Once you have made your decision on the next page, please place the letter into envelope 2, whether or not you chose to accept the bonus payment.”

Letter of acknowledgment and thanks

- I gratefully thank { *Lahore University of Management Sciences / the U.S. government* } for its generosity and I accept the bonus payment offer.
- I choose not to accept the bonus payment offer.
-

شکریہ اور تصدیق کا خط

میں تہہ دل سے لاہور یونیورسٹی آف مینجمنٹ سائنسز کا اس کی فراہمی کے لئے شکریہ ادا کرتا ہوں اور اضافی رقم قبول کرتا ہوں۔

میں اضافی رقم قبول نہیں کرتا۔

Payment

- ▶ Subjects asked to come to front of the room in order of subject number; gave materials to coordinator and returned to seat to await payment
- ▶ With 24 packets, two RAs went to separate room to calculate payment
- ▶ Payments sealed in an envelope; bills wrapped in thick debriefing handout so subjects could not tell others' payment amount
- ▶ Subjects called in front of room, were paid, and sent out into a waiting bus; subsequent session began immediately

⇒ Consent, participation, and payment designed to maximize anonymity and eliminate social costs of expression

Balance of Covariates

	LUMS				U.S. government				p-value
	Low payment		High payment		Low payment		High payment		
	Pri (1)	Pub (2)	Pri (3)	Pub (4)	Pri (5)	Pub (6)	Pri (7)	Pub (8)	
Ec activity?	0.468 (0.042)	0.489 (0.042)	0.518 (0.043)	0.489 (0.043)	0.500 (0.042)	0.529 (0.042)	0.521 (0.042)	0.518 (0.042)	0.97
Age	23.2 (0.4)	23.6 (0.5)	23.6 (0.4)	24.2 (0.4)	23.3 (0.4)	23.8 (0.5)	24.2 (0.5)	23.6 (0.4)	0.63
Single	0.696 (0.039)	0.691 (0.040)	0.691 (0.039)	0.683 (0.040)	0.748 (0.038)	0.669 (0.040)	0.674 (0.040)	0.684 (0.040)	0.90
Yrs of ed	12.1 (0.2)	11.9 (0.3)	11.8 (0.2)	11.7 (0.2)	12.1 (0.2)	11.5 (0.3)	11.7 (0.3)	12.0 (0.2)	0.55
<i>Ethnicity</i>									
Punjabi	0.090 (0.025)	0.098 (0.026)	0.096 (0.025)	0.104 (0.027)	0.101 (0.027)	0.093 (0.026)	0.119 (0.028)	0.105 (0.027)	1.00
Pashtun	0.634 (0.042)	0.632 (0.042)	0.640 (0.041)	0.634 (0.042)	0.643 (0.042)	0.667 (0.042)	0.622 (0.042)	0.654 (0.041)	1.00
Baluchi	0.082 (0.024)	0.120 (0.028)	0.103 (0.026)	0.067 (0.022)	0.093 (0.026)	0.093 (0.026)	0.096 (0.025)	0.075 (0.023)	0.88
<i>Religion</i>									
Shia	0.037 (0.016)	0.045 (0.018)	0.083 (0.024)	0.060 (0.021)	0.040 (0.017)	0.076 (0.023)	0.045 (0.018)	0.038 (0.017)	0.66
Sunni	0.844 (0.031)	0.841 (0.032)	0.812 (0.034)	0.851 (0.031)	0.849 (0.032)	0.855 (0.031)	0.895 (0.027)	0.880 (0.028)	0.67

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Measuring Political Identity

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- ▶ Rejection rate of U.S. 100 Rs private payment: 25.2%
- ▶ Rejection rate of LUMS 100 Rs private payment: 8.4%
(p-value of difference < 0.001)
- ▶ Results nearly identical with individual covariates and session F.E.

▶ Regressions

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- ▶ *Higher* rejection rate of 100 Rs LUMS payment in public suggests embarrassment or other effects working against our moderation findings

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- ▶ *Higher* rejection rate of 100 Rs LUMS payment in public suggests embarrassment or other effects working against our moderation findings
- ▶ Gap in rejection rates (U.S. vs. LUMS) shrinks from 16.8% to 5.9% (p -value=0.069)

▶ Regressions

Self-Image versus Social Image Concerns

Evidence of conformity:

- ▶ Stronger moderating effect among those who know more people in the room
- ▶ Subjects correctly perceive their relative anti-Americanism:
 - ▶ Those who accepted: 18.6% view themselves as strictly more anti-American than the other participants
 - ▶ Those who rejected: 63.6% view themselves strictly more anti-American
- ▶ Incentivized elicitation of views on others' acceptance (for 100 Rs private U.S. offer):
 - ▶ Median guess: 95.6% (mean: 80%) of others accepted bonus payment offer
 - ▶ Median guess among those who rejected: 87% (mean: 62%) accepted the offer

Sensitivity to Payment Size

- ▶ Random subsample received 500 Rs offer
- ▶ Private rejection rates:
 - ▶ U.S. government: goes down from 25.2% to 9.7% ($p < 0.001$)
 - ▶ LUMS: from 8.4% to 5.6%

▶ Regressions

Table: Revealed and Stated Preferences in Experiment 1

	Negative views about U.S. aid (1)	Negative views about U.S. government (2)	Negative views about Japan aid (3)	Negative views about Japan government (4)
Rejected	0.627*** [0.081]	0.542*** [0.085]	0.020 [0.076]	0.042 [0.071]
Mean (accepted U.S. offer)	0.115*** [0.032]	0.152*** [0.035]	0.175*** [0.038]	0.125*** [0.033]
Observations	139	141	139	140

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Experiment #2: Design

Conducted September 19 - October 21, 2015 in areas surrounding Lahore

Stage 1: “canvassing wave” prior to local elections

- ▶ Visit by surveyors to elicit party membership
- ▶ Respondents also asked several questions to gauge knowledge of political parties
 - ▶ PTI widely considered most anti-American major party, though not everyone was aware of this

Experiment #2: Design

Stage 2: “preference elicitation wave” conducted by a different survey team

- ▶ Subset of wave 1 respondents reached in wave 2 – targeted 1,200 successful wave 2 matches
- ▶ Relative to Experiment 1, modified method to allow elicitation at respondents’ homes using Android tablets

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10-question personality survey, then:

- ▶ Half of subjects assigned to a condition in which they were offered a 100 Rs. bonus payment paid for by the U.S. government
 - ▶ Private choices; “cover” provided by randomly-assigned lottery payment in total compensation for completing the survey
- ▶ Half asked direct questions about their views on U.S. gov. and U.S. gov. aid

Experiment #2: Sample

Selection, balance and comparison with sample from Experiment 1:

x	Experiment 1 (1)	Experiment 2		Stage 2		p-value	
		Stage 1 (2)	Stage 2 (3)	Revealed Preference (4)	Stated View (5)	Column (2)=(3) (6)	Column (4)=(5) (7)
Currently engaged in economic activity?	0.504 [0.015]	0.797 [0.009]	0.799 [0.012]	0.791 [0.016]	0.807 [0.016]	0.869	0.475
Age	23.7 [0.2]	26.5 [0.1]	26.4 [0.2]	26.2 [0.2]	26.7 [0.2]	0.857	0.150
Single?	0.692 [0.014]	0.499 [0.011]	0.500 [0.014]	0.514 [0.020]	0.486 [0.020]	0.889	0.329
Years of Education	11.9 [0.1]	10.0 [0.1]	10.0 [0.1]	10.1 [0.1]	10.0 [0.1]	0.401	0.615
Number of observations	1152	1991	1212	611	601		

Experiment #2: Results

- ▶ Rejection rate of 100 Rs. (in private): 34%
(vs. 25% in Experiment 1)

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Among subjects considering PTI the most anti-American party and planning to vote:

- ▶ Rejecting the offer is associated with a 180% increase in the probability of being a member of the PTI (from 2.8% to 7.9%)
- ▶ Alternatively: rejection rates among these PTI members 58% vs. 32% among non-members
- ▶ No (or negative) correlation between PTI membership and having negative *stated* views about the U.S. gov. and U.S. aid

Table: Do Revealed and Stated Preferences Predict PTI Membership?

Dependent Variable	Member of PTI Party (=1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rejected Bonus Payment (=1)	0.276* (0.145)	0.271* (0.157)				
Views U.S. Gov't Negatively (=1)			-0.188 (0.119)	-0.291** (0.124)		
Views U.S. Aid Negatively (=1)					-0.037 (0.126)	-0.129 (0.125)
Constant	0.371*** (0.083)	1.144 (1.301)	0.479*** (0.073)	1.548 (1.020)	0.429*** (0.072)	1.666 (1.045)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-squared	0.067	0.241	0.032	0.257	0.001	0.205
# Observations	52	52	72	72	72	72

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Alternative Explanations (1)

Other intrinsic motives for rejecting payment?

- ▶ Was rejection an expression of distaste for accepting a money offer?
 - ▶ Differences from LUMS rejection rates suggest this is not driving our findings
- ▶ Was rejection an expression of general anti-foreign sentiment or anti-government sentiment?
 - ▶ Strong correlation between rejection and stated anti-American views; no correlation with stated views on Japan
- ▶ Might subjects have been insulted by payment size?
 - ▶ Unlikely: even the 100 Rs payment is quite large

Alternative Explanations (2)

Instrumental/consequential motives present?

- ▶ Might anti-American individuals prefer to *take* money from the U.S. government?
 - ▶ Doesn't seem that way: see the correlation with stated views (and the follow-up study)
- ▶ Is payment rejected in expectation of an effect on American policy?
 - ▶ Stakes for U.S. government trivial; median rejecting participant believed that 87% accepted offer, so unlikely that any subject viewed himself as pivotal or unique

Alternative Explanations (3)

Social costs/benefits:

- ▶ Lower rejection rates in public expression condition suggest perceived observability could drive *down* rejection rates
- ▶ Did subjects accept payment out of fear of U.S. government?
 - ▶ A great deal of care was taken to preserve anonymity: no signature required; acceptance also required checking a box on the same form; envelopes that obscured payments and bonus payments that obscured choices
 - ▶ No effect of U.S. offer on stated risk aversion, and risk averse not less likely to reject U.S. offer
 - ▶ Choices post-offer suggest subjects were not paranoid: no effect of U.S. offer on subsequent high response rate and 10–20% of subjects self-report negative or relatively negative views of the U.S. after *accepting* payment

External Validity

- ▶ Our sample consists of Pakistani, literate, young men:
 - ▶ Broad representation from across Pakistani ethnic groups; selected from several regions: same patterns across all main ethnic groups represented
 - ▶ Of course, *not* representative, but a population of interest
- ▶ Experiment #2 allows us to replicate main result and establish some degree of external validity

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Summary

We attempt to isolate an identity-driven revealed preference underlying political behavior

- ▶ Significant minority of Pakistani men willing to forgo sizable payment simply to avoid checking a box affirming gratitude toward the U.S. government

Summary

We attempt to isolate an identity-driven revealed preference underlying political behavior

- ▶ Significant minority of Pakistani men willing to forgo sizable payment simply to avoid checking a box affirming gratitude toward the U.S. government

Evidence of moderation of expression

- ▶ Expectation that expression will be publicly observed leads to reduction of rejection of the payment; higher financial cost of expressing anti-American views leads to fewer men rejecting the payment

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Evidence of the predictive power of measured political identity

- ▶ It predicts behaviors outside of the experiment such as anti-American party membership

Thank You!

EXTRA SLIDES

Table: Measuring Political Identity

Dependent Variable:	Rejected (=1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
U.S. government	0.168*** [0.043]	0.169*** [0.043]	0.175*** [0.046]
Mean LUMS offer (low, private)	0.084 [0.023]	0.084 [0.023]	0.084 [0.023]
Session FE	No	Yes	Yes
Covariates	No	No	Yes
Observations	286	286	243

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table: The Effect of the Public Treatment

Dependent Variable:	Rejected (=1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Public × U.S. government	-0.109* [0.060]	-0.107* [0.060]	-0.141** [0.064]
Public	0.027 [0.035]	0.028 [0.036]	0.066* [0.038]
U.S. government	0.168*** [0.043]	0.169*** [0.043]	0.179*** [0.045]
Mean LUMS offer (low, private)	0.084 [0.023]	0.084 [0.023]	0.084 [0.023]
Session FE	No	Yes	Yes
Covariates	No	No	Yes
Observations	571	571	488

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table: Price Effects

Dependent Variable:	Rejected (=1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
High payment \times U.S. government	-0.127** [0.053]	-0.127** [0.053]	-0.129** [0.056]
High payment	-0.028 [0.030]	-0.027 [0.033]	-0.016 [0.033]
U.S. government	0.168*** [0.043]	0.169*** [0.042]	0.181*** [0.044]
Mean LUMS offer (low, private)	0.084 [0.023]	0.084 [0.023]	0.084 [0.023]
Session FE	No	Yes	Yes
Covariates	No	No	Yes
Observations	572	572	499

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%