
## **Teaching Slides for:**

# The Impact of the First Professional Police Forces on Crime

Journal of the European Economic Association

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# What Effect Did the Introduction of the London Metropolitan Police (the 'Met') Have on Crime?

#### Fundamental modern-day institution $\rightarrow$ origins date back to 1829.

• First professional force in the world and model for many others.

Distinct from decentralized, community organized policing of the past:

• Size, centralized authority, emphasis on quality, independent of local wealth, *deterrence*.

#### First empirical evidence on causal effect of this key institution on crime.

- Quasi-experimental research design.
- Newly digitized data from two core sources to measure crime in London.
  - i. Old Bailey Trials: geocoded into treatment & control areas.
  - ii. Daily Police Reports: incidents from police offices pre- and post-Met.

#### Three Contributions to Two Literatures

#### Understanding of police-crime relationship

- 1) Old question in new context.
- 'Old' literature: More police manpower and visibility reduce crime (e.g. Chalfin and McCrary, 2017; Draca et al., 2011; Di Tella and Schargrosky, 2004).
- Study the creation of an institution rather than its expansion: Does the crime reduction depend on institutional structures, force size, and officer experience?
- 2) Little studied aspect of policing: force administration and quality.
- "[...] relatively scant evidence on the extent to which non-deployment related policies reduce crime" (Owens, 2020).
- Evaluate effect of replacing decentralized, local community organized policing with a centralized, public force in which officer quality was monitored.

#### State capacity literature

3) Often takes a macro perspective. Uses micro-data to study a core state capacity institution (police necessary to successfully enforce laws + required degree of state capacity for successful implementation of reform).

# History of London Policing: Pre and Post-Met

# 'Policing' Before the London Met

#### Watchmen

- 1285 Statute of Winchester: required a watch in all towns manned by local residents.
- Community policing: neighbours watching out for (and arresting) neighbours.
- Watch duty was unpopular! → Watch Acts (late 1700s): avoid service with *watch rate*.
- Locally funded → Watch quality varied with parish wealth. (Superior watches: St James, St Marylebone, St George – well-paid, patrolling in multiple night shifts.)
- Early 1800 criticisms: incompetent, improper and corrupt, responsible only to local parish, inability to cope with large disturbances without military aid.



Charlie Rouse, London's last night-watchman. Source: London Metropolitan Archive

# 'Policing' Before the London Met

#### **Bow Street Runners** (1750):

- Only 8 Runners (sworn constables).
- Located and arrested serious offenders.
- Initially earned livings from 'rewards'.
- Bow Street House: Collection point of incidents by late 1700s.

#### **Other Bow Street forces:**

- Horse Patrol (1805) highways to London.
- Dismounted Horse Patrol beyond London.
- Foot patrol (1790) central London. Disbanded with creation of the Met.
- $\rightarrow$  ~ 400 persons when Met created.

#### 7 additional 'Police Offices' (1792):

- 3 magistrates + up to 12 constables.
- Magistrates responsible for processing cases (*pre- and post-Met until 1839*).
- Recorded daily incidents and charges available from 1828 (data source).



# 'Policing' Before the London Met

#### **Poor salaries:**

- Office constables: 21 shillings/week = 55 pounds/year.
- Watchman 12-16 shillings/week.
- System of extras → Fees (e.g. testifying), rewards, corruption.

Incentives to catch criminals: not to deter them.

#### Charles Dickens in 1850:

"We are not by any means devout believers in the Old Bow Street Police. [...] as a Preventive Police they were utterly ineffective, and as a Detective Police were very loose and uncertain in their operations, ..."

# Why Was the Met Created (When It Was)?

A response to crime? Yes, but: Recognition of limitations of pre-Met 'police'!

"[...] offences against property have of late increased in and near the metropolis; and the local establishments of nightly watch and nightly police have been found inadequate to the prevention and detection of crime, by reason of the frequent unfitness of the individuals employed, the insufficiency of their number, the limited sphere of their authority, and their want of connection and co-operation with each other [...]" (From Metropolitan Police Act)

Earlier calls & attempts to reform (unify) local parish 'policing' encountered strong resistance from rich parishes and City of London.

**Sir Robert Peel**: Home Secretary in 1822. Emphasized legal reform (e.g. consolidated laws, started abolition of death penalty) in early part of decade.

- Learned how to get reforms through Parliament.
- Convinced parishes new police wouldn't cost more (not quite true in the end).

# **Estimated Salary Costs of the Met**


		Initial Fo	rce (1829)	Expanded Fo	rce (May 1830)
Position	Pay Rate (in Peel letter)	Force Size	Salary Costs	Force Size	Salary Costs
Police force					
Superintendents	annual 200 pounds	8	1,600	19	3,800
Inspectors	annual 100 pounds	20	2,000	42	4,200
Canaganta	daily 3 shillings 6 pence				
Sergeants	(est. annual 55 pounds)	88	4,805	220	12,012
Countal lan	daily 3 shillings				
Constables	(est. annual 47 pounds)	895	41,886	2919	136,609
Administration					
Commissioners clerks					
Clerk 1	annual 200 pounds	1	200	1	200
Clerk 2	annual 150 pounds	1	150	1	150
Clerk 3	annual 90 pounds	1	90	1	90
Receivers clerks					
Chief clerk	annual 200 pounds	1	200	1	200
Clerk 2	annual 150 pounds	1	150	1	150
Total annual admin cost (1829 pounds)			790		790
Total police force cost (1829 pounds)			50,291		156,621
Total police force cost (2018 pounds)			5,421,348		16,883,765

Source: Letter written by Sir Robert Peel in July of 1829 for 1829; extrapolation to 1830 based on officer numbers in other data sources. Annual pay: Assume 6-day week, 52 weeks. Shilling = 12 pence; pound = 20 shillings. Bank of England inflation calculator: 1829 pound worth 107.8 of 2018 pound.

# **Metropolitan Police Act of 1829**

- October 1829: 1,000 hired in 6 inner divisions.
- By May 1830: > 3,000 with 11 outer divisions.
- Catchment area: *About* 7-mile radius from Charing Cross (up to 15 in 1839).
- **Excluded**: City of London (own force 1832/1839) and Thames River Police (until 1839).
- Regardless of size of area, all divisions had  $\sim$ 150 officers.
  - Potentially more visible walking shorter beats in inner divisions, i.e. more intense treatment?
  - 2 treatment areas: < 4 and 4-7 miles from Charing Cross
- 'Old' police offices: all within 4-miles radius, but catchment area includes City and areas beyond 4- and 7-miles boundaries.






# Features of the Metropolitan Police

- Sharp increase in police numbers.
- Centralized structure.
- Incentive structure promotion.
- Emphasis on quality/behaviour.
- Tasked with *deterrence*: walk regular beat at 2.5 miles per hour.
- Uniforms recognizable, badge numbers to report misbehaviour.
- Not expected to solve crimes (Detective Division in 1842).


#### Sir Robert Peel's Principles of Law Enforcement 1829

- 1. The basic mission for which police exist is to prevent crime and disorder as an alternative to the repression of crime and disorder by military force and severity of legal punishment.
- The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.




A gentlemanly, friendly, fair, non-violent, non-discriminatory, respectful force to prevent crime...!

# Fast Growth of Metropolitan Police



**Sources:** Weekly hiring from 1829 to 1856, Register of first 3200 hires, including assigned division.

# Evidence of increased standards and quality: High initial turnover and dismissals.



Sources - Home Office: Police Entry books (data on removals from 1833 to 1841); Weekly hiring from 1829 to 1856.

# Framework: How Could the Met Affect Crime and Crime Statistics?

#### Framework: Crime vs. Crime Statistics

New police can **reduce crime** via two channels.

- *Deterrence:* more police, visible day and night, uniforms, constant patrols.
- *Incapacitation:* apprehend offenders (prison, death, transportation sentences).
  - Goal was deterrence, but cannot rule out (or disentangle) incapacitation.
  - Both effects likely to increase over time with more experience and discipline.

#### **Potential confounders:** New police can affect recorded *measures* of crime.

- Increase in *clearance rates?* 
  - → Concern for admin data (charges, trials).
  - → New police not tasked with clearing crimes but could be relevant for e.g. street crimes.
- Increase in *crime reporting?* 
  - → Lower opportunity cost to report a crime, especially (minor) property crimes?
  - → Potentially: if new authority 'trusted'.
  - $\rightarrow$  May  $\uparrow$  over time as trust/quality increase.

Important: Both confounders work against finding a crime reducing effect.

# London analysis (I): Diff-in-diff design using Old Bailey geocoded trials

### Trials at the Old Bailey (Central Criminal Court of London)

# Old Bailey Proceedings Online Robbery, May 12, 1831 (t18310512-16)

1002. JOHN HARKNETT and WILLIAM WILLIAMS were indicted for feloniously assaulting George Davies, on the **21st of April**, **at St. Leonard, Shoreditch**, putting him in fear, and taking from his person, and against his will, 2 shillings, and 12 halfpence, his monies.

JOHN ALLPORT . I live at No. 71, Kingsland-road, and am an undertaker. I was in Shoreditch on the night of the 20th of April, or the morning of the 21st - it was a quarter-past twelve o'clock; I was going home - I got very near to Plough-yard, and saw a man....round the prosecutor; the three men stooped to pick up the halfpence off the pavement - I saw no money except the halfpence; they then walked off, at least I do not know exactly whether they walked or ran - they did not go fast; a Policeman came across the road - I told him of it, and pointed out the three men; I never lost night of them from the time I saw them go from the prosecutor till I told the Policeman - he followed them, and I went with him; I saw him take the two prisoners - I had not lost sight of them; a watchman came up after the Policeman seized the prisoners, and he assisted in taking them to the station – the ...

JOHN MCWILLIAMS . I am a Police-constable, (No. 181 H.) I was on duty in Shoreditch on the night of the 20th of April - my attention was drawn to the opposite side of the way, by hearing a person...

#### 1821-1837 trials.

• Including pleas and acquittals.

#### Most serious offences.

• Murder/manslaughter (N=258), robbery (N=578), burglary/housebreaking (N=1429).

#### Manually coded information.

- Geocode crime locations (intersection, parish): *treatment vs. control area*.
- Date of crime: *pre and post Met*.
- Police witness characteristics (#, type, at crime scene?):

#### Map crimes into 4 areas.

- < 4 miles from Charing Cross (treated)
- 4-7 miles (*uncertain* treatment)
- City of London (control area)
- > 7 miles (*control* area)

## 'First Stage': Evidence of Reform Implementation

**Idea:** Use police witness characteristics to test for changes in number and type of police (at trial) after the Met was created.

$$PoliceType_{iot}^{a} = \gamma_1 PostMet_t + \alpha_o + \varepsilon_{iot}$$

• Area a, trial i, date t, offense o.

#### **Results:**

- No effect on any police witness.
- Changes *type of witness*: More new, less old police in treated areas (→ inner circle).
- Some increase in control areas (potential explanations discussed on next slide)


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
	Any	Any	Any	Police at				
Y:	police	"new"	"old"	crime				
	witness	police	police	scene				
Sample:	1828-1832	1828-1832	1828-1832	1828-1832				
Treated (	<4 miles)							
PostMet	-0.018	0.540***	-0.485***	0.007				
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.045)				
N	427	427	427	427				
Uncertain	n (4-7 miles)							
PostMet	-0.071	0.357***	-0.133	-0.092				
	(0.145)	(0.117)	(0.211)	(0.187)				
N	31	31	31	31				
Control (	>7 miles)							
PostMet	-0.007	0.088**	0.059	-0.052				
	(0.083)	(0.038)	(0.096)	(0.077)				
N	89	89	89	89				
City of L	City of London							
PostMet	-0.096	0.113	-0.201*	-0.156				
	(0.059)	(0.081)	(0.103)	(0.103)				
N	100	100	100	100				

# Potential 'Spill-overs' in Policing (excluding City of London)


Explanations for increased police in control areas?

- Measurement error in geocoding or increased use of term 'police' by court reporters.
- Actual *spill-overs* in policing but no visible evidence of spill-over at 7 mile threshold below.

#### Police at crime scene



#### New versus old police at trial



## The Effect of the Met on Crime (Old Bailey)

**Diff-in-Diff model:** Change in crime in treated areas versus control areas pre-post Met.

**Aggregate data:** Outcome = number of trials for offense o in each month (m) & area (a).


$$Trials_{amy}^{o} = \gamma_{1}(Treatment * PostMet)_{amy} + \gamma_{2}(Uncertain * PostMet)_{amy} + \alpha_{y} + \alpha_{m} + \alpha_{a} + \varepsilon_{amy}$$


#### Areas (baseline):


- Treated: < 4 miles (*Treatment*), 4-7 miles (*Uncertain*).
- Control: > 7 miles, City of London.

Intro History Framework London Met (I) London Met (II) County Conclusion

Data Visualization: Trials per Month and Area (a) for each offence (o).







## The Effect of the Met on Crime (Old Bailey)

#### Parallel trends assumption and potential confounders:

- 1832 cholera,
- other justice reforms,
- population growth,
- crime displacement.

#### **Estimation**

- City of London control in the baseline; demonstrate robust to alternative classification as treated in April 1832 (with formation of City Day Police)
- Short and long windows: short window helps deal with many potential confounders
- OLS in baseline, with Poisson and extensive margin results alongside.
  - Correct model depends on multiple factors, including (i) whether effect of Met should be proportional to population and (ii) differences in the moments (mean and variance) of outcome variable for treated and control areas.

## Main Results, OLS (Old Bailey)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sample:	1821-37	1828-32	1828-32	1828-32	1828-32
City of London:	Control	Control	Treated: April 1832	Uncertain	Excluded
Panel A. Burglary					
Post Met x Treatment	-0.106	-0.294	-0.285	-0.234	-0.120
	(0.370)	(0.660)	(0.474)	(0.686)	(0.701)
Post Met x Uncertainty	0.016	0.006	-0.013	0.116	0.180
	(0.149)	(0.288)	(0.298)	(0.319)	(0.377)
<u>Panel B. Robbery</u>					
Post Met x Treatment	-1.032***	-1.297***	-0.832***	-1.281***	-1.336***
	(0.219)	(0.428)	(0.299)	(0.433)	(0.438)
Post Met x Uncertainty	0.129	0.228	0.288*	0.144	0.189
	(0.088)	(0.162)	(0.170)	(0.189)	(0.208)
<u>Panel C. Homicide</u>					
Post Met x Treatment	-0.008	0.120	0.072	0.188	0.222
	(0.139)	(0.251)	(0.181)	(0.262)	(0.266)
Post Met x Uncertainty	-0.049	-0.055	-0.062	0.100	0.047
	(0.057)	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.133)	(0.143)
Observations	816	240	240	240	180
Year, month, area FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

- Robbery ↓ by 40-46%.
- 12-15 trials per year in <4-mile radius.
- Robust to City classification.
- No (significant) effects for burglary or homicide.
- Similar to Draca et al. (2011): no effect on burglary, but effect on robbery.
- No (significant) effect in uncertainty area.

## Main Results: Poisson and Extensive Margin (Old Bailey)


	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	
Sample:	1821-37	1828-32	1821-37	1828-32	1821-37	1828-32	
Specification:		Intensive margin: By		Extensive margin (1/0): By		Extensive margin (1/0): By	
Specification.	mont	h/area	week		month/dist	tance band	
	QML Pois	sson (IRR)	OI	LS	Ol	LS	
<u>Panel A. Burglary</u>							
Post Met x Treatment	0.821*	0.951	-0.069*	-0.062	-0.032	-0.064	
	(0.091)	(0.124)	(0.036)	(0.069)	(0.036)	(0.072)	
Post Met x Uncertainty	1.290**	1.015	-0.006	-0.029	0.031	-0.028	
	(0.144)	(0.133)	(0.026)	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.059)	
<u>Panel B. Robbery</u>							
Post Met x Treatment	0.727	0.693*	-0.115***	-0.127*	-0.116***	-0.168**	
	(0.341)	(0.141)	(0.033)	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.069)	
Post Met x Uncertainty	1.705	2.928***	0.020	-0.002	0.018	0.027	
	(0.800)	(0.597)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.030)	
<u>Panel C. Homicide</u>							
Post Met x Treatment	0.618***	1.053	0.026	0.064	0.000	0.044	
	(0.094)	(0.482)	(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.028)	(0.051)	
Post Met x Uncertainty	0.975	0.433*	-0.005	-0.007	0.002	-0.008	
	(0.148)	(0.198)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.024)	
Observations	816	240	3,604	1,060	3,672	1,080	
Year + area FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Month FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
Week FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	

Same sign, differences in precision.

#### **Robust to:**

- alternative windows (1825-35),
- area trends,
- excl. "fuzzy" locations/ crime dates.
- Cluster by area (wild cluster bootstrap).

## **Event Study (Old Bailey)**



- Supportive of **parallel trends:** No evidence for systematic pre-trends.
- **Robbery**: Immediate and persistent effect (significant using 2-year lead/lag intervals). Close to average difference-in-difference estimate.
- Burglary & homicide: No effects in short-run or long-run.
- Not shown: No significant effects for the uncertainty area.

### **Potential Confounders?**


- ✓ City of London treated by City Police (April 1832)?
  - $\rightarrow$  Robustness checks.
- ✓ Police spill-overs to control areas?
  - $\rightarrow$  Little evidence (and would work against  $\downarrow$  in crime in diff-in-diff).
- ✓ Criminal justice reforms?
  - → Would affect both treatment and control group; estimation window avoids abolition of death penalty for burglary & robbery (1837).
- ✓ First cholera epidemic of 1832? → Mitigated by short window.
- ✓ **Differential population growth?** → Mitigated by short window.
- ✓ Crime displacement?  $\rightarrow$  No evidence seen in the data.

#### Cholera epidemic: Deaths of Met Police officers



- Data from historical death registers: Cholera arrived and peaked in 1832.
- Short-term (and concentrated: Jul-Sept).
- Avoided with short-time window (robustness test: cut sample in May 1832).

# Historical population growth (by region of London)




- Data from ONS historical population.
- Population growth faster (if anything) in inner (treated) areas: works against us (if more people = more crime).
- Mitigated by short-time window.

### Crime Displacement? Difference in means 1828-32

	Burglary				Robbery			Homicide	
	Pre	Post	Δ	Pre	Post	Δ	Pre	Post	Δ
1828-1832,	1828-1832, $Y = Number of crimes per month/area$								
Treated	4.70	4.40	-0.30	2.80	1.33	-1.48 ***	0.70	0.85	0.15
Uncertain	0.40	0.40	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.03	-0.03
Control	1.15	1.03	-0.13	0.30	0.28	-0.03	0.25	0.08	-0.17
City	0.95	1.05	0.10	0.50	0.35	-0.15	0.15	0.30	0.15
All	1.80	1.72	-0.08	0.91	0.51	-0.40 **	0.29	0.31	0.03

- Only evidence of change in crime is reduction for robbery in treated area.
- No evidence here of substitution to control or less treated areas.



# **Summary of the Old Bailey Analysis**

#### **Study effect on three offences:**

- Robbery: Significant reduction
  - → Deterrence/incapacitation > increase due to clearance (and reporting).
- Burglary: No consistently observed effect.
  - → No deterrence/incapacitation or offset by clearance (and reporting)?
- Homicide: No effect.

Advantage: Serious enough to minimize reporting bias concerns.

#### **Disadvantage:** External validity?


- Only 7% of all Old Bailey trials from 1820-1830.
- Do results generalize to other types of violent and property crimes? This is answered in the analysis of the second data source.

London analysis (II): Pre-post design using Daily Police Reports.

# **Daily Police Reports**

CHARLES BUXTON, with uttering two counterfeit sixpences, to shopkeepers, in Shoreditch, and with having five in his possession.—For re-examination on Friday next.

ELIZABETH SWAN, with stealing half a sovereign the money of some person unknown.—Discharged.



RICHARD THOMAS otherwise STEPHEN GRAVES, ith having committed divers felonies and misdemeanors.— or examination on Saturday next.

THOMAS ADAMS, and MARIA BULLOCK, with stealg three quarts of brandy, the property of Rebecca Gapp, idow, keeper of the 'White Lion' public house, Penton**Daily (Mon-Sat) reports** for each of the 9 pre-Met 'police offices'/magistrates (existed until 1839).

- Jan Apr: 1828, 1830, 1831, 1832
- [May-Dec 1828/1829 missing]

#### For each day and office, 4 crime measures:

- 1. Daily 'informations' (viol., prop., other).
- 2. Daily 'stolen property' reports.
- 3. Number charges: Violent, property, other.
- $\rightarrow$  Uncleared incidents (1 and 2) vs. cleared (3).
- 4. Aggregate total: best proxy of total crime.

#### Advantages / disadvantages:

- + *All* property and violent crimes (Old Bailey offences + many more). → *Reporting bias relevant*.
- *No geocoding* offices or offenses into treatment and control. → *Pre-post specification: net effect on London crime (accounting for displacement).*

# **Summary Statistics**

On average, 7.3 crimes *per day and office*: most of them property.

		Pre-Met	Post-Met	Post-Met
Sample Period	All	1828	1830	1830-32
Total Crime: Informations +				1030 32
No incidents: All	7.30	6.69	7.03	7.50
No incidents: Property	5.75	5.19 †89		5.93
No incidents: Violent	0.20	0.30 \40		0.17
No incidents: Other	1.35	1.20	1.26	1.40
	1.33	1.20	1.20	1.40
<u>Informations</u>	0.51	0.70	0.40	0.40
No informations: All	0.51	0.79	0.49	0.42
Any informations: All	0.31	0.47	0.32	0.26
Any informations: Property	0.27	0.37	0.28	0.24
Any informations: Violent	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.03
Any informations: Other	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.04
Property stolen				
No incidents	0.41	0.61	0.38	0.34
Any incident	0.29	0.39	0.30	0.26
<u>Charges</u>				
No charges: All	6.38	5.28	6.16	6.74
No charges: Property	4.95	4.01 ↑	4.83	5.25
No charges: Violent	0.16	0.19	↓ 0.14	0.14
No charges: Other	1.28	1.08	1.20	1.35
N (day x office)	3,232	800	816	2,432

## The Effect of the Met on Crime (Daily Police Reports)

**Pre-post model:** Change in daily crime after introduction of the Met Police.

$$Y_{it} = \beta PostMet_t + \alpha_w + \alpha_d + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- Outcome: Y = measure of crime in office i on date t.
- **PostMet**: =1 on all dates *t* after introduction of Met (1830-1832), =0 before (1828).
- Office FE  $(\alpha_i)$ : unobserved heterogeneity across offices, e.g. more offenses from certain London areas or different magistrates.
- Calendar week  $(\alpha_w)$  and day of week  $(\alpha_d)$  FE: 'seasonality' across & within weeks.

#### Limitations of Pre-Post design: Cannot capture confounders with control group.

- Focus on short window, with no contemporaneous reforms.
- Old Bailey pre-post and diff-diff findings comparable.
- Advantage? Estimates the net effect of the Met on crime in all of London. No displacement concerns.

# Main Result s

		(1)		(2)		(2)
		(1)		(2)		(3)
Sample:			1828-	-1830: $N = 1$	,616	
Crime type:		Total		Property		Violent
Panel A. Number of all inciden	<u>its</u>					
Post Met	+5%	0.347**	+8%	0.406***	-39%	-0.115***
		(0.154)		(0.135)		(0.026)
Panel B. Any daily information	<u>1S</u>					
Post Met	-32%	-0.148***		-0.090***		-0.049***
		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.012)
Panel C. No. daily information	<u>ıs</u>					
Post Met	-38%	-0.301***		-0.170***		-0.064***
		(0.046)		(0.039)		(0.014)
Panel D. Any 'stolen property'						·
Post Met		n/a	-25%	-0.099***		n/a
				(0.023)	\	
Panel E. No. daily charges				, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
•	+17%	0.890***	+21%	0.827***	<sup>26</sup> / <sub>26</sub> %	-0.050**
		(0.140)		(0.121)		(0.022)
Office, week, day of week FE		Yes		Yes		Yes

Violent crime reduction ≈ 300 violent crimes per year (-.115 \* 6 days \* 8 offices \* 52 weeks).

Property crime + overall effect → clearance and reporting channels > deterrence/incapacitation.

→ consistent with Old Bailey's null effect (reporting bias less relevant).

## **Additional Analyses**

#### Robustness checks.

- ✓ Alternative aggregation level (weekly instead of daily).
- ✓ Exclude incomplete weeks of data (holidays) or one office at a time.
- ✓ Specification: QML Poisson.
- ✓ Longer post-period (until 1832).
- ✓ Clustering by office (conventional clustering, wild cluster bootstrap).

#### **Expanded specification: Short- and medium-term dynamics.**

- Allow for different post-effects in:
  - i. January 1830 (only first wave of initial hiring)
  - ii. February April 1830 (includes second wave of hiring)
  - iii. 1831
  - iv. 1832
- Estimates generally increase over time, with increasing quality + continued hiring.
- Significant property crime increase kicks in at 2<sup>nd</sup> wave: increased reporting with gained trust and/or clearance with experience?

# **Extension: County roll-out of forces**

# **Crime Reducing Effects Specific to the Met?**

So far: London Met reduced violent crime; less visible effect on property crime.

- 1839 Act: Justices *could* create police for all/part of county.
- 1856 Act: Insufficient implementation of earlier acts: Forces mandatory.
- → Annual certification as efficient.
- → <u>Sufficient</u> force size: officers per capita (target of 1,000 people per officer)

#### **Two questions:**


- (i) What is the effect of having any police force?
- (ii) Does initial force quality (size per capita) matter?

#### Digitize new data:


- Police: Year formed and initial size (Police History Society: Stallion and Wall, 1999).
- *Crime*: Annual number persons committed or bailed for trial per fiscal year ending Sept 29 from *Judicial Statistics*. → Aggregate into violent, property, other property.

#### **Summary of Results:**

- Any county force: On average, no significant effect on crime, overall or by type.
- Sufficiently large force: Total crime reduced by 19%, comparable across categories.



#### Year of formation (48 counties)



- No obvious clustering of neighbours.
- Earliest reformers not just those closest to London.
- Before 1840: 16 counties.
- 1841 1856: 9 counties.
- 1857 (mandatory) 23 counties.

# **Empirical Specification: Difference-in-differences**

$$Crime_{ct} = \beta Force_{ct} + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + X_{ct}\theta + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

- Crime: log number of persons committed to trial in county *c* and fiscal year *t*.
- **Force:** 1 for county- fiscal year combinations with a professional force.
- County fixed effects:  $\alpha_c \rightarrow$  constant differences across counties (e.g. pre-existing crime levels).
- Year fixed effects:  $\alpha_t \rightarrow$  national shocks (criminal justice reforms).
- Sample window:  $1832-1865 \rightarrow 8$  years before and after earliest and latest reform years, respectively.
- Sample: 48 counties → drop Middlesex, Suffolk, York, Sussex.
- County x year panel of 1,632 observations.
- Identifying assumptions: parallel trends, random timing.
  - → Supported by event studies and regressions showing observables do not predict timing.
- On average, no significant effect on crime → overall or by type.

	Y: Log (no. charges)
Panel A: A	ll Charges (N=1632)
Force	-0.024
	[0.033]
Danal D. L	Galant Changes (N-1421)
Panel B. V	<i>Tiolent Charges (N=1431)</i>
Force	-0.031
	[0.050]
Panel (	C: Property Charges
(N=1440)	
Force	0.017
	[0.042]
Panel D: 0	Other Charges (N=1356)
Force	0.002
	[0.078]

### A Force in Name Only? Heterogeneity by Relative Force Size

$$Crime_{ct} = \beta_s SuffForce_{ct}^j + \beta_{ins} InsuffForce_{ct}^j + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + X_{ct}\theta + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

Y: Log (no. charges)											
	Force sufficiency threshold (j)										
	1500	2000	2500								
Panel A: All Charges (N=1632)											
Force < X	-0.190***	-0.118**	-0.079								
	[0.062]	[0.055]	[0.048]								
Force > X	0.022	0.053	0.066								
	[0.043]	[0.057]	[0.075]								
Panel B: Vio	olent Charges	(N=1431)									
Force < X	-0.183*	-0.129*	-0.093								
	[0.104]	[0.070]	[0.062]								
Force > X	-0.002	0.034	0.048								
	[0.058]	[0.078]	[0.104]								
Panel C: Pr	operty Chargo	es (N=1440)									
Force < X	-0.143**	-0.063	-0.028								
	[0.065]	[0.066]	[0.057]								
Force > X	0.064	0.090	0.101								
	[0.050]	[0.060]	[0.083]								

- Sufficient size: 10 (30) counties sufficiently large at 1500 (2500) thresholds (people/officer).
- Sufficiently large force reduces total crime by 19%. Comparable across categories.
- Insufficiently large force does not affect total crime. → Some (insignificant) increase in property crime.
- **Identification:** Force size is conditionally random (few observables, e.g. crime or neighbouring forces, predict force size).
- Robustness: Control for population, region FE, inspector region trends, neighbouring forces.

# **Conclusion**

# **Concluding Remarks: Summary**

# Introduction of the London Metropolitan Police = first professional police:

- Significantly decreased violent crime by about 40%.
- Corresponds to at least 15 fewer robberies and 300 fewer violent crimes per year ( $\rightarrow$  lower bound if reporting bias).
- Property crime reduction not visible, but cannot be ruled out (→
  increase in reporting might offset decrease in crime).

# **Concluding Remarks: Magnitudes**

- Relative size of violent crime reduction comparable in magnitude to contemporary studies (e.g. Draca et al. 2011, using terror-related shocks in London).
- $\rightarrow$  But clearly imperfect comparison.

#### Instead, think about effect sizes relative to size of reform or its costs.

- By May 1830:  $\sim$ 3000 officers with annual salary = 157,000 pounds (1829).
- Our results: 300 fewer violent crimes per year.
- $\rightarrow$  About 1 violent crime deterred by 10 officers per year or cost of 500 pounds.

#### These ratios are conservative:

- Crimes prevented are lower bounds: offsetting biases due to clearance and reporting.
- Over-estimate cost: do not measure marginal cost relative to spending on pre-Met police.

# **Concluding Remarks: Reform Success**

Creation of this first professional police was successful in different ways:

- i. (Violent) crime decreased.
- ii. Even an increase in clearance and/or reporting is an achievement for an institution aiming to protect society.
- iii. Successful implementation of a reform of this scale is evidence in and of itself of state capacity in early 19th century England.